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Executive Summary 
 
One of the important problems confronting the modern state is to identify the way(s) to make the 
best use of scarce public resources. This problem is, however, more evident in developing 
countries where cases of widespread corruption and misappropriation of public funds abound. In 
Bangladesh, for example, independent research and government’s ‘watchdog’ agencies have 
confirmed large-scale embezzlement of funds and wastage of public resources by those formally 
responsible for their ‘proper’ management. Perhaps the most important factor accounting for the 
huge number of irregularities and incidence of malfeasance in public expenditure is the failure to 
comply with a well-structured internal control system. There is apparently a complete breakdown 
of the internal control mechanism within the administrative system as a whole. This, in turn, 
necessitates the introduction and strengthening of external control over the activities of 
government. Despite certain shortcomings, parliamentary surveillance provides one of the best 
external means of guarding against the abuse of administrative/financial power in Bangladesh 
where other avenues of control are extremely weak, if not non-existent. The normative 
justification for legislative control over public expenditure rests on the assumption that as the 
premier representative body, a parliament has a responsibility to assure (the electorate) that the 
public money is not wasted; rather it is used economically and effectively. Finance is at the core 
of most if not all government activity. By having the authority to sanction the raising and 
spending of money for certain designated purposes, a parliament can hope to have a mutually 
influential relationship with the executive. The principal value of justifying legislative monitoring 
of the executive is to ensure the triumph of representative government by lines of accountability 
running through the organ that embodies popular sovereignty.   
 
Formally, the parliament in Bangladesh can exercise control before the money is appropriated; 
provisions also exist for legislative monitoring of public expenditure after it has been approved. 
In practice, the role of the parliament remains mostly limited to the latter functions; whatever 
scope exists for pre-voting scrutiny of public expenditure does not have much impact. For 
example, the outcome of the discussion and vote on the budget- the annual financial statement, 
which records government’s financial transactions in the previous financial year and represents a 
statement of the government’s financial plans- can be predicted beforehand. Although most of the 
members have an opportunity to discuss the budget, rarely is it amended in any form. In 
particular, there is relatively little scope for sustained scrutiny of the budget. The Rules of 
Procedures of parliament (hereafter Rules) do not allow any committee-stage scrutiny of the 
budget, the appropriation bill and the finance bill. The constitutional restriction on floor-crossing 
ensures the dominance of the government -financial or otherwise.  
 
There is, however, relatively better scope for parliamentary scrutiny of expenditure after it has 
been approved and incurred. Such surveillance is mostly exercised through a set of financial 
committees- the Estimates Committee (PEC), the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the 
Public Undertakings Committee (PUC). Among the three financial committees, the PEC has a 
broader remit; it can suo moto examine any expenditure; its main task is to suggest ways of 
achieving economy and efficiency in administration. The PAC exercises what can be called ex 
post facto control. It examines the expenditure after it has been actually incurred. Its main task is 
to see whether expenditure has been incurred in accordance with the authority parliament. The 
main responsibility of the PUC is to examine the reports and accounts of the public undertakings 
and to check if affairs of the public undertakings are being managed in accordance with sound 
business principles and prudent commercial practices. 
 
Besides the financial committees, the standing committees on different ministries, referred to here 
as oversight committees, have also some role in the review of public expenditure. Since 
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allocations are made to different government organizations for some specific purposes and 
programmes, the oversight committees can seek to ensure prudence in public spending by 
overseeing the ways these programmes are implemented. By having the power to review the 
enforcement of policy (and programmes) and in particular, the right to conduct inquiry into 
irregularities in the administration of public programmes, oversight committees can help check 
the misuse of funds, at least, formally.      
 
The successive parliaments have set up both financial committees and oversight committees; their 
scope of functions have also undergone important changes. Both sets of committees now enjoy 
greater deterrent power- the power to inquire into irregularities and mismanagement in different 
public organizations and to suggest means to rectify them. This, in fact, gives them their greatest 
strength. However, the extent to which the different committees have exercised their permissive 
power in a balanced way is not known. In fact, our understanding about the scope and limits of 
the parliamentary control of government activities in general, and public expenditure in 
particular, is extremely limited. This report seeks to redress this imbalance. It explores the 
committee-level scrutiny of expenditure, identifying specifically the role of three financial 
committees (PEC, PAC and PUC) and a sample of four oversight committees- the Finance 
Committee (FC), the Education Committee (EC), the Health and Family Welfare Committee 
(HC), and the Committee on Posts and Telecommunication (P&TC). The report seeks to compile 
the specific outputs of these committees for the last few years, find out the implementation status 
of their decisions and suggest mechanisms which allow for better monitoring of such decisions as 
well as propose new areas of work for the committees which could improve accountability and 
transparency of public expenditures.  
 
Comparatively speaking, both sets of committees set up by the seventh parliament appear to be 
more active than their predecessors, meeting more regularly and exploring alternative ways of 
strengthening their surveillance over the administration of public programmes and expenditure. 
Among the financial committees, the PAC has outdistanced the others both in holding meetings 
and reporting to the House. Unlike its predecessors, which mostly examined the CAG reports that 
were more than a decade old, the present PAC has scrutinised both current and old audit reports. 
In fact, it has already examined some of the reports for 1996-7. In particular, a large number of 
special audit reports submitted to the parliament until 1998 have already been scrutinised by the 
committee. It has also suggested the introduction of performance audit and value for money audit 
on a selective basis in various government organizations and projects. As a first step, it has 
suggested that it may be introduced in 1% of the (nearly 22,000) organizations annually audited 
by the CAG. Some organizations have already adopted these new types of auditing.  
 
The PEC, which traditionally remained mostly inactive, has had a new beginning since the 
election of the seventh parliament. It has detected large-scale corruption and misappropriation of 
funds in different government organizations. It has already set up seven sub-committees to 
investigate into various financial irregularities, including the dominant tendency of most of the 
organizations to spend more than actually necessary in the implementation of development 
projects. It has, in fact, focused more on development expenditure, identifying the (willful) ways 
those responsible for ensuring economy in expenditure actually inflates it, and thereby causing 
serious loss to the treasury. The PEC, however, has not made any major review of the budget 
proposals or details of estimates (of revenue expenditure) of different departments. The Chairman 
of the Committee has argued that no tangible achievement can be made through scrutinising the 
budget (including supplementary budget), but a lot of anomalies can be detected through 
examining the procedures involved in the implementation of development projects. In particular, 
a huge sum of public money can be saved if micro-level estimates of expenditure rather than 
macro-level estimates are scrutinised.    
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The PUC, however, has remained less active than its counterpart in the fifth parliament (1991-
95). Not only has it met less regularly but it has also not reported to the parliament even once. On 
the other hand, the PUC of the fifth parliament reported twice and its activity received greater 
public and political attention. One of the important reasons is that the PUC did not have a 
chairman for a long time after its first chairman was made a state minister. It has, however, been 
meeting more frequently over the last few months, and made some significant progress in 
assessing the activities of a number of organizations. But the members have a more generic 
interest in examining policy and administrative issues; the financial issues per se have not 
received any major attention. 
 
Like the financial committees, the scale of activism of the oversight committees has also varied, 
with some meeting more regularly and probing more deeply into the activities of different 
executive agencies, than the others. Among the four sample oversight committees, the FC has 
held the maximum number of meetings, averaging 18 (meetings) per year. But the HC has 
exercised its deterrent power more frequently than the others. It has already undertaken two major 
inquiries into the irregularities in the administration of various health-related programmes and 
identified those responsible for financial mismatch. The P&TC has also been comparatively more 
active than before; it has set up a number of sub-committees to inquire into many serious lapses- 
financial and administrative. None of the sub-committee, however, has yet submitted its report. 
The EC remains the least-active among the oversight committees. Although it has held more 
meetings than the P&TC, the nature of oversight activity it has exercised, in a sense, lacked both 
depth and focus. Although it has routinely examined the working of different executive agencies 
under the Ministry of Education, the nature of issues raised and discussed do not appear to have 
much policy or financial significance. 
 
In general, however, although the various committees appear to be more active than before, the 
actual impact of committee scrutiny remains less than significant. When the committees are 
evaluated by “preordained objectives”, they cannot be considered as a major success. One 
exception is the PAC, which has had greater success in influencing the behavior of different 
officials and agencies. The committee has succeeded in recovering more than TK. 2000 million to 
the exchequer; its recommendations for adjusting millions of TK. and for taking departmental 
actions against the recalcitrant officials are apparently more honored now than before. However, 
although the effectiveness of the PAC, to some extent, can be measured in quantitative terms, the 
task of identifying the achievements and influence of other committees is difficult. One of the 
most important objectives underlying the parliamentary scrutiny is to influence the behaviour of 
officials, i.e. to make them behave according to legislative intent, which is difficult to measure. 
One way to do so is to see the extent to which the ministries/agencies look upon the 
recommendations/suggestions of different committees with respect. Available evidence shows 
that the ministries do not voluntarily agree to implement them. Generally the recommendations 
made by different committees remain unimplemented. Most of the committees have expressed 
dismay at the slow implementation/non-implementation of decisions by different ministries. 
However, those that have sought to follow up decisions made earlier have had more impact than 
those trailing behind in this respect. Officials/Ministries also have a tendency to defy the 
directives of committees; they often remain reluctant to supply important documents needed for 
proper inquiry. Whenever supplied, many of these documents remain incomplete. Lack of inter-
committee consultation often reduces the influence of committees.  
 
This is, however, not to argue that the committees have miserably failed; to the contrary, both sets 
of committees have fared better than those elected in the past in almost every respect: holding 
meetings, scrutinizing bills, overviewing the activities of ministries and conducting inquiries. 
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Among the financial committees, the PAC and the PEC have received more attention. The latter 
(PEC) has, to some extent, become a 'feared' institution. Even the opposition members in the 
committee have lauded its role. Many organizations, as the chairmen and members of the 
committee have observed, have become aware of the fact that they cannot easily engage in 
wrong-doing without the risk of being made accountable to it. In other words, the existence of 
this committee can provide a counterweight, influencing many defaulting officials to become 
careful while planning the future course of action.  
 
There is, however, no ‘one best way’ to increasing the influence of committees. In fact, until the 
bureaucracy and the party system are reformed, committees are unlikely to have any lasting 
impact. Both provide serious constraints to the efficient functioning of parliament, in particular, 
committees. This is not to argue that committee reforms be suspended until progress can be made 
in reforming the party and the bureaucracy. No committee has yet succeeded in utilising its full 
potential or exercising its permissive powers in an optimum way. One of the important ways to 
strengthen the committees is to provide them with adequate staff support and services. Most of 
the committees remain seriously disadvantaged in these respects. The parliament, at present, is 
not much aware of the activities of committees. In the absence of any provision (mandatory or 
otherwise) for regular reporting to parliament, much of what the committees do remain unnoticed. 
Also whatever contacts take place between the committees and the government departments 
remain outside the public purview. There is thus the need for making the activities of committees 
transparent by allowing them to meet in public and/or requiring them to report on their activities 
to parliament at regular intervals. The government should also be required to respond to the 
recommendations of the committees in public. There should be scope for more ‘informed’ 
scrutiny of the budget and the appropriation and finance bills; this can easily be done by 
withdrawing the existing legal bar on referring them to committees. The CAG, who provides the 
lynch-pin of financial management, be given more freedom of action; this can be done by making 
him an officer of the parliament, as have many other countries done. The parliament in 
Bangladesh has more committees than many other similar legislatures. Periodic review by a 
liaison committee may help prevent duplication of efforts by different committees and may also 
discourage them to work at cross- purposes.        
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Parliamentary Control Over Public Expenditure 
in Bangladesh: The Role of Committees 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
State of the Use of Public Expenditure 
 
1. One of the important problems confronting Bangladesh is to identify the way(s) to ensure 
‘responsible’ government (and administrative) behavior. In particular, it has long been 
recognized that the task of making the government accountable for ‘proper’ use of public 
funds appears to be extremely difficult. Thus, notwithstanding a general call for restraint, the 
size of public expenditure has grown over time. The average expenditure-output ratio hovered 
around 15 per cent of the GDP during 1973-89; while the revenue-output ratio was 8 per cent. 
This caused a major fiscal disequilibrium. Although the extent of this disequilibrium has been 
reduced to 6 per cent in subsequent years, the growth of public expenditure has continued 
unabated, reaching as high as 18 per cent of the GDP in 1997-98 (Appendix 1). This appears 
to be paradoxical given the public commitments of the successive governments to reduce the 
size of the public sector spending. There have also been some changes in the structure of 
government expenditure over time (Appendix 2). The extent to which the allocation of 
resources between different competing sectors follows any rational principle or is made 
according to the ‘rule of thumb’ method is not easy to identify. 
 
2. Nor is it argued that the growth in public expenditure per se is inherently bad. In fact, in the 
context of widespread poverty and inequality that characterize the Bangladesh society as a 
whole, the government cannot easily abandon the responsibility for providing different 
services to the people; hence the need for greater public outlay. What, however, concerns the 
‘thinking’ public is the extent of public resources that is being wasted. It is now conventional 
wisdom that a certain percentage of public resources are not used efficiently and effectively. 
Reports of widespread corruption and inefficiency in the administration of public expenditure 
almost routinely appear in national dailies and weeklies. Independent research and 
government’s so-called ‘watchdog’ agencies have also confirmed misappropriation of public 
funds and wastage of resources. Those responsible for planning and administration of public 
expenditure do not appear to have any success in ensuring that the public resources are not 
wasted.  
 
Lack of Internal Control 
 
3. The existing mechanisms used for ensuring financial control and accountability within the 
government appear to be defective. A recent World Bank document observes that there is 
apparently a complete breakdown of the internal control mechanism within the administrative 
system as a whole. The huge number of irregularities and incidence of malfeasance in public 
expenditure and investment can be directly attributable to the failure to comply with a well-
structured internal control system. There is a serious decline in hierarchical control within the 
public service and an absence of an ‘inward sense of personal obligation’, thus causing 
serious shortfall in administrative performance. The rise of trade unionism, both at the higher 
and lower echelons of the bureaucracy, has exacerbated the problem of hierarchy and control. 
This, in turn, necessitates the introduction and strengthening of external control over the 
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activities of government. Despite certain shortcomings, parliamentary surveillance provides 
one of the best external means of guarding against the abuse of administrative/financial 
power in Bangladesh where other avenues of control are extremely weak, if not non-existent.  
 
Need for External Control:  
 
4. There is, however, no ‘one best (legislative) way’ of ensuring the accountability of the 
government. But it is now generally recognized that one of the important ways of making the 
government behave is to oversee in a regular and effective manner the ways it (government) 
raises and spends public money. Formally a parliament can exercise control before the money 
is appropriated; provisions also exist for legislative monitoring of public expenditure after it 
has been approved (by parliament). The normative justification for legislative control over 
public expenditure rests on the assumption that as the premier representative body, a 
parliament has a responsibility to assure (the electorate) that the public money is not wasted; 
rather it is used economically and effectively. Finance is at the core of most if not all 
government activity. By having the authority to sanction the raising and spending of money 
for certain designated purposes, a parliament can hope to have a mutually influential 
relationship with the executive. Without it, there would be no reason at all for the executive 
to take parliament seriously. The principal value of justifying legislative monitoring of the 
executive is to ensure the triumph of representative government by lines of accountability 
running through the organ that embodies popular sovereignty. The specific objectives to be 
achieved through legislative oversight are many, but the following demand mention: to check 
against dishonesty and wastage, to guard against harsh and callous (i.e. arbitrary and 
unresponsive) administration, to evaluate implementation in accordance with legislative 
objectives, and to ensure administrative compliance with statutory intent. 
 
Mechanisms of Parliamentary Control 
 
5. Most of the parliaments patterned after the Westminster model utilize almost similar 
techniques to require the government to account for its actions in respect of financial 
management. These can broadly be grouped into two categories: individual and collective. 
The best example of the collective method is a system of (financial) committees. The 
widespread use of committees can provide an effective means of underpinning the authority 
of the legislature against the executive. Two parliamentary committees that are said to have 
an ‘unequal’ influence in controlling public expenditure are the Committee on Public 
Estimates (PEC) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The former is concerned with 
conducting ex ante scrutiny of estimates; while the PAC exercises what can be called ex post 
facto control. The Public Undertakings Committee (PUC) can also be an important source of 
financial control and accountability. The individual category includes a number of techniques 
such as questions and adjournment motions. The most important (individual) technique, 
however, is the scope for discussion and voting on the budget- the annual financial statement- 
which records government’s financial transactions in the previous financial year and 
represents a statement of the government’s financial plans. 
 
Parliamentary Committee and Accountability:  
 
6. The individual and the collective techniques of control differ with each other in several 
respects. The most important difference, however, relates to the breadth and depth of 
scrutiny. Compared with other techniques such as questions and debates, committees have a 
better scope to go much deeper into a particular issue, examining it in greater detail and 
exploring possible remedies.  Committees also enjoy a legitimate right to call for persons, 
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papers and documents. This can thus have an immediate effect. Those responsible for 
governing have to account for their actions to a small body; this enables members to keep 
them (officials) on their toes more effectively. To be more precise, while in the case of 
individual devices depth  is often lost to breadth, committees can help achieve both.  
 
7. An important deterrent power enjoyed by committees, specially financial and investigative 
committees, is to conduct inquiries. Unlike individual devices, which can at most prompt the 
conduct of inquiries, committees can do them on their own. This, in effect, gives them their 
most strength. By having the power to conduct an inquiry, the committees are as important 
for what they can do as much as for what they actually do. Civil servants are aware that their 
work may be subject to inquiry, an awareness that encourages more rigor in working 
practices as well as greater sensitivity to possible parliamentary reaction.  
 
8. Another difference between committee and other individual techniques, for example, 
questions, relates to the objectives they are intended to serve. For example, research shows 
that debates and questions are often asked for partisan purposes. In contrast, committees 
generally operate along non-partisan lines. Thus although composed of what can be called 
'party (wo)men', they are not ‘partisans’ or interested parties in the sense we use the term. 
They mostly work on a cross-party basis. Committees provide an important setting for inter-
party bargaining and compromise. In general, decisions made by committees are often seen as 
consensual measures.  
 
9. The above arguments are not intended to overstress the importance of committees. Nor is it to 
argue that the traditional means of parliamentary accountability are unimportant; they in fact 
serve several important purposes such as exposing secrecy, puncturing arrogance, and 
providing a platform for the expression of alternative views and a public forum in which to 
challenge the government. What is, however, observed here is that the traditional means of 
parliamentary accountability and committees are not mutually exclusive. They can reinforce 
each other in a number of ways. In fact, committees, especially oversight committees, have 
been adopted deliberately as a means to supplementing the more traditional 
accountability/control mechanisms, although they have now acquired more importance.  
 
Factors Affecting Committee Influence 
 
10. However, much of what committees can do depends upon a number of factors. These can be 
grouped into two categories: structural and behavioral. Structure provides the scope and 
limits of committee influence and work specifying, for example, its formal-legal status, 
nature of composition and permissive powers. It also sets the parameter for guiding the 
behavior of members. The actual behavior of members may, however, differ significantly 
from what is statutorily prescribed. Notwithstanding their broad remit to oversee the 
(administrative/financial) operation of government departments, an oversight 
committee/financial committee may still remain handicapped because of the behavioral 
orientation of members. Two aspects of the behavioral orientations of members- willingness 
and ability- are especially important. Willingness is referred to here as the motivation of 
members to do what is expected of them; while ability is referred mostly to their level of 
competence. Both are influenced by a number of internal and external variables. The internal 
variables include, among others, the personal characteristics of committee members such as 
education and occupation, their orientation to role, influenced mostly by their age in 
parliament, their nature of job, i.e part-time or full-time, and their ability to assume 
responsibility as trustees. External variables include the nature of government 
departments/bureaucracy, constituency characteristics of members and political culture. 
Committees are likely to have greater effects in those cases where the willingness and the 
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ability of members converge. On the other hand, they are unlikely to have many significant 
effects if the two conflict with each other. Appendix 3 summarizes the factors that influence 
the committee behavior. 
 
The problem 
 
11. The Constitution of Bangladesh and the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament (hereafter 
Rules) provide for elaborate mechanisms for ensuring the financial accountability of the 
executive government in Bangladesh. The Constitution makes it mandatory for the parliament 
to set up a PAC; while the Rules specify the roles and responsibilities of different committees 
including PUC and PEC. Both the Constitution and Rules provide for detailed procedures to 
be followed by parliament while transacting financial business in the House. The successive 
parliaments in Bangladesh (with the exception of the third parliament) have set up these 
financial committees with a view to overseeing the financial operation of the government. All 
successive parliaments have also routinely passed budgets and allowed the members to 
express themselves. 
 
12. However, the extent to which parliamentary scrutiny of public expenditure is more a 
formality than a reality has yet not been ascertained properly. In fact, our understanding about 
the types of activities the financial committees undertake, the nature of problems they face, 
and the strategies they adopt to cope with uncertainties is very limited. Nor do we know much 
about the way(s) members of different committees perceive their role or/and define inter-role 
relationships. Nor do we know much about the significance of the discussion of the budget. Is 
the passage of the budget simply a ritual? Does it serve any purposes other than empowering 
the government to raise and spend public money? How far is budget used as an instrument of 
economic and political control? The extant literature on budgeting in Bangladesh does not 
adequately answer these questions. Nor do the existing studies on the parliament in 
Bangladesh provide much information on the working of parliamentary committees in 
Bangladesh. Whatever studies are available on committees remain deficient in several 
respects; these are mostly descriptive in nature and none specifically focuses on either the 
oversight committee or the financial committee. Nor do the recommendations made to make 
the committee system effective have much empirical grounding.1  
 
Scope and Methods of the Study 
 
13. This report explores the scope and limits of parliamentary control over public expenditure in 
Bangladesh. It focuses on the collective method, identifying the role of three financial 
committees and a sample of four ministerial committees, referred to here as oversight 
committees, in the scrutiny of public expenditure. The report seeks to compile the specific 
outputs of these committees for the last few years, find out the implementation status of their 
decisions and suggest mechanisms which allow for better monitoring of such decisions as 
well as propose new areas of work for the committees which could improve accountability 
and transparency of public expenditures. The three financial committees are PEC, PUC and 
PAC; while the four oversight committees are the Finance Committee (FC), the Education 
Committee (EC), the Health and Family Welfare Committee (HC), and the Committee on 
Posts and Telecommunication (P&TC). While the financial committees and the FC have a 
more ‘direct’ role in the scrutiny of public expenditure, the role of the oversight committees 
                                                          
1One major exception is the comprehensive Advisory Opinion on the reform of the Rules of Procedure 
made recently by two international parliamentary experts, which is yet to be made public.  
  
 10
 
 
 
 
 
in the process is also no less prominent. Since allocations are made to different government 
organizations for some specific purposes and programs, the oversight committees can seek to 
ensure prudence in public spending by overseeing the ways these programs are implemented. 
By having the power to review the enforcement of policy (and programs) and in particular, 
the right to conduct inquiry into irregularities in the administration of public programs, 
oversight committees can help check the misuse of funds, at least, formally. Several methods 
such as review of existing studies on parliament, examination of the proceedings of 
parliaments and committees, and in-depth interviews with committee chairmen and members, 
and some other key actors have been used to collect information for this report.             
 
Organization of Study 
 
14. The report is organized into a number of sections. The following section identifies the ground 
rules for parliamentary surveillance of public expenditure in Bangladesh. The structure and 
organization of committees and their scope of work have been described in section three. 
Section four provides a detailed examination of the working of the (sampled) financial and 
oversight committees; while their actual impact is assessed in section five. The limits of 
committee influence in comparative context are described in section six.  Proposals for 
reform are given in section seven.      
 
Parliamentary Surveillance of Public Expenditure: Ground Rules 
 
Scope for Parliamentary Surveillance 
 
15. Legalistically, the parliament grants supply, authorizes expenditure and checks disbursement. 
Article 83 of the constitution provides that no tax can be levied or collected except by or 
under an authority of an Act of parliament. Nor can any expenditure be incurred without its 
approval. In practice, these powers can be seen as more formal than real. Proposals for raising 
revenue and spending money are generally made by the executive government. These are 
normally embodied in the annual financial statement, commonly known as the budget. Every 
year the government introduces in the parliament a budget showing the estimated receipts and 
expenditure for that given year. The document shows the sums required to meet both charged 
and voted expenditure. The charged expenditure can be discussed but cannot be subjected to 
vote; while the ‘non-charged’ expenditure can be both discussed and voted. The monies 
raised by the government are credited to two funds: consolidated fund and public account. All 
revenue received by the government, all loans received by it and all moneys received in 
repayment of any loan form part of the consolidated fund. All other public moneys received 
by or on behalf of the government are credited to the public account.  
 
16. The expenditure that are charged upon the consolidated fund includes the remuneration 
payable to the President, the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, the judges of the Supreme 
Court, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), the Election Commission, the chairmen 
and members of the Public Service Commission (PSC), and the expenses related to these 
offices and the debt charges for which the government is liable. If for any reason the 
government spends more than authorized by parliament, it has to seek approval for additional 
spending before the commencement of the next financial year. Also, if for any reason, the 
parliament fails to authorize expenditure, the President, on the advice of the Prime Minister, 
can authorize the withdrawal from the consolidated fund, moneys necessary to meet 
expenditure for a period not exceeding sixty days in a particular year, pending the making of 
the grants and passing of the laws. This is thus intended as a safety-valve to ensure continuity 
in the governing process (discourage government shut down). 
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Parliamentary Stages of the Budget Process 
 
17. The parliament, in general, does not have any significant role in the planning of public 
expenditure; it remains the responsibility of the executive government. It is only after the 
budget is presented in the House that the members have a formal scope to deliberate over the 
proposals embodied in it. The budget in parliament follows a three-step process. After the 
presentation of the budget (first stage), the second stage begins with a general discussion on 
it. It provides the most important opportunity for members to express their views on the 
whole of the budget; they are also entitled to raise and discuss any issue they consider 
important. Even issues that are not related to the budget can also be routinely discussed. The 
Rules, however, do not allow any motion to be moved at this stage. Nor can budget be 
submitted to the vote of the House. The Business Advisory Committee (BAC) decides in 
advance the time needed for discussing the budget at different stages. Usually more time is 
allotted for the general discussion of the budget. In 1999, nearly 35 hours were allotted for 
the general discussion; while in 1998, it was about 43 hours. Nearly all of the members of 
parliament have an opportunity to take part in the general discussion. 
 
18. After the general debate on the budget is over, discussion on demands for grants and 
appropriations in respect of charged expenditure commences. This is merely a formality. As 
the constitution and the Rules bar voting on the charged expenditure, this stage of the budget 
process in parliament does not cause any major excitement. But the proposals for voting on 
demands for grants for different government departments/ministries always cause controversy 
and heated debates. Usually a separate demand for grants is proposed for each ministry; the 
Finance Minister, however, can include in one demand grants proposed for more than one 
ministry. The Rules require that each demand shall contain first a statement of the total grant 
proposed and then a statement of the detailed estimate under each grant divided into items. 
Discussion and vote on demands for grants always generate heat and controversy. It is, 
however, at this stage that the members can move motions to reduce expenditure; the Rules 
do not allow any motion aimed at increasing expenditure. Nor can any motion be proposed 
for altering the destination of a grant. Members can move three types of motions to reduce 
expenditure; these are commonly referred to as policy cut, economy cut and token cut. When 
a member proposes that the amount of the demand be reduced to Tk. 1, it is referred to as 
policy cut. This implies that the member expresses his/her no confidence in the policy 
underlying the demand. The member in his motion has to indicate in precise terms the 
particulars of the policy he proposes to discuss; (s)he may also propose an alternative policy. 
When a member proposes that the amount of demand be reduced by a specified amount, 
which can either be a lump sum reduction in the demand, or reduction of an item in the 
demand, it is referred to as economy cut. Members often find it difficult to move the economy 
cut, as it requires widespread knowledge and a thorough study of the budget document. 
Motions for token cut are moved more frequently than the other cuts. These are intended to 
ventilate specific grievances; the discussion remains confined to such grievance. When a 
member moves a motion proposing that the amount of the demand be reduced by Tk. 100, it 
is called a token cut. The number of cut motions moved over the last few years is given in 
Appendix-4. Conventionally, members of the treasury bench do not move cut motions, as it is 
considered tantamount to expressing no-confidence against their own party government. This 
may also reveal lack of control of the party leadership over the backbenchers.     
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19. The Speaker has the final authority to decide on the admissibility of a cut motion. The scope 
of subjects raised in the cut motion is very wide. For discussion on and passing of demands 
for grants, a time limit is prescribed. The Minister concerned is called upon to wind up debate 
before the demand is put to vote. Thereafter the motions for demands for grants of different 
departments are put to vote. As time constraints do not allow the discussion and vote on each 
demand, what most Speakers do is to use guillotine to dispose of the business. In general, 
only the demands for a few departments are discussed and made subject to vote; the other 
demands are straightaway put to vote. In 1999, only 4 of the 94 demands for grants made by 
the prime minister's office, home, defence and law and parliamentary affairs were actually 
discussed; the rest were guillotined by the chair. In 1998, cut motions relating to 7 of the 92 
total demands were actually discussed. 
 
20. After all the demands for grants have been passed, an appropriation bill, embodying both 
charged expenditure and voted expenditure, is moved in the parliament. The bill, in essence, 
is intended to give legal effect to demands for grants that have already been passed by the 
House. No amendment can be proposed to any such bill, which has the effect of varying the 
amount of any grant so made or altering the purpose to which is to be applied or varying the 
amount any expenditure charged on the consolidated fund. The debate on an appropriation 
bill generally remains restricted to matters of public importance or administrative policy 
implied in the grants covered by the bill, which have not already been raised. After the 
passage of the appropriation bill, the government moves the finance bill with a view to giving 
effect to its financial proposals for the following financial year. Procedures followed to pass a 
finance bill are similar to those applicable to ordinary bills. After the bill has been passed and 
the President assented to it, the government gains the legal right to raise money. 
 
Limits of Parliamentary Control Over the Budget 
 
21. One of the important characteristics of the parliamentary stage of the budget process is that it 
does not allow any committee-stage scrutiny of financial/expenditure proposals before these 
are actually passed. At no stage is the budget subject to any scrutiny by the committee. The 
Rules specifically bar referring the budget, the appropriation bill and the finance bill to any 
committee. Whatever scope exists for the committee scrutiny of expenditure commences only 
after the budget has been passed. Theoretically, parliament has control over the public purse; 
technically, it in this area that the so-called parliamentary sovereignty can be noticed. No 
money bill passed by the parliament can be challenged in any court; nor can the President 
withhold assent to it. In practice, however, the sway of the executive government over public 
finance is more pervasive and more complete than on other areas of parliamentary activity.  
 
Nature of Budget Debate- A Sample Account 
 
22. Formally, there is some scope to discuss the budget in the parliament; in practice, however, 
rarely is it amended in any form. Nor does the budget debate generate much public 
enthusiasm and excitement; to the contrary, the repetitive nature of arguments made during 
the budget debate risks making the parliament a target of public attack and disapproval. In 
general, the debate on the budget lacks substance and focus. It has almost become a general 
pattern for members of the treasury bench to eulogize the budget; while the opposition rarely 
finds anything 'good' in it. However, although this type of behaviour characterises the budget 
debate every year, some issues can be considered to be budget-specific. During the last 
budget debate (1999), for example, members belonging to the two benches were seen as 
extremely active in trading accusations and counter-accusations against each other.  In fact, 
they exchanged abusive languages and vulgar expressions to such an extent that the Speaker 
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even once threatened to switch-off the microphones of those using unparliamentary word. 
Although Article 270 of the Rules specifies that a member has to follow some norms while 
speaking in the House, rarely is the debate followed in an orderly manner. The business 
managers of the two benches, rather than discouraging the members to behave in a deviant 
way, allocated more time to them to engage in abusive exchanges. Notwithstanding the 
Speaker's warning, members from both sides were engaged in mud slinging at each other; 
even the front-benchers including the Prime Minister did not remain an exception.  
 
23. This is, however, not to suggest that there was no discussion on the budget per se at all. The 
members, in fact, deliberated over a range of issues, of which two deserve mention. The 
ruling party beackbenchers followed the lead of the ministers, defending the 5.2 per cent 
growth rate of the economy, which most doubted. On the other hand, the opposition claimed 
that the statistics was 'doctored'. The opposition law-makers blamed the government for 
destroying the national economy; some of them also alleged that the budget was prepared on 
the basis of Indian prescription to protect the interest of Indian businessmen. The ruling party 
members, on the other hand, termed the budget as development-oriented. The two benches 
also failed to reach consensus on any of the demands for grants. In general, the budget is 
mostly passed as a partisan document; it is rare for the finance and appropriation bills to be 
passed as consensual measures. The budget debate is intended more to score political points 
than to have a critical analysis of government's economic policy.  
 
Comparing Parliamentary Financial Procedures 
 
24. The procedures followed for transacting financial business in the Bangladesh parliament have 
both similarities as well as differences with other Westminster systems. In most of the 
Westminster-derived parliaments, budgets are not subject to serious parliamentary scrutiny. 
But nowhere do Rules or constitutions legally bar the committee scrutiny of any stage of the 
budget-making process. Thus, although the budget as a whole is not generally referred to 
committees in Westminster systems, some aspects of the budgetary process are nevertheless 
subject to some scrutiny by committees. In Britain, finance bills are referred to standing 
committees, while the oversight committees are entrusted with the task of examining the 
expenditure, administration and policy of the departments they shadow and the associated 
bodies under them. The oversight committees in Australia and Canada also now-a-days 
scrutinise the expenditure of different departments; in both countries, the minister responsible 
for each department appears before the committee to justify the estimates publicly, bringing 
along departmental officials so that the committee members can ask for clarification. The 
Senate estimate hearings in Australia is increasingly becoming popular with MPs and those 
interested in parliamentary studies. The Finance and Expenditure Committee of the New 
Zealand Parliament is charged with scrutinising the estimates before these are discussed on 
the floor of the House; other select committees can also examine estimates of concerned 
departments. Even the Parliament in India, which did not allow any major scrutiny of 
estimates until recently, now refers the demands for grants of different ministries for review 
and scrutiny after the general discussion on the budget is over. The need to innovate this 
device became imperative when it was apparent that the parliamentary scrutiny of 
expenditure was almost a 'misnomer'. In Nepal also, oversight committees are specifically 
charged with scrutinising the estimates of revenue and expenditure. These committees are 
required to report to the parliament before budgets are passed.  
 
25. But Bangladesh remains a deviant case. The Rules do not allow any sustained scrutiny of 
expenditure, at least until the budget is passed. Bangladesh, however, has adopted almost a 
similar system for ex post facto scrutiny of the expenditure as have other countries. In almost 
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every country that has patterned its government after the Westminster model, there exists a 
PAC to check if the money has been spent properly; its role is, however, limited to being able 
to ‘bolt the door after the horse has fled’. The lynch-pin in the system of financial control in 
every country is the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG); he provides expert advice and 
support to the PAC. The actual relationship between the CAG and PAC, however, varies 
from country to country; so also does the effectiveness of the mechanisms intended for 
controlling the public expenditure. We shall refer to the factors accounting for the differential 
performance of different mechanisms in a subsequent section.         
 
Parliamentary Committees:  Structure, Membership and Scope of Work 
 
26. Formal Framework of Committees: Parliamentary committees in Bangladesh owe their origin 
to, and gain legitimacy from, two sources: the Constitution of the Republic and the Rules of 
Procedure of Parliament (hereafter Rules). The Constitution makes it mandatory for the 
Parliament to set up a Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and a Privilege Committee, and 
empowers it to constitute as many standing committees as it considers necessary. The Rules, 
on the other hand, specify the actual number of committees to be set up and delineate their 
formal scope of operation. These also specify the composition of different committees and 
prescribe some other important matters such as the way(s) decisions are to be taken, the 
procedures to be followed to convene meetings of a committee and the methods used for 
examining witness. 
 
27. Parliamentary committees in Bangladesh formally enjoy important status and extensive 
powers. A committee can regulate its sittings and the way it conducts its business. It can 
obtain co-operation and advice from any expert in its field, if deemed necessary. A committee 
may appoint as many subcommittees as it considers necessary. Each subcommittee has the 
power of the main committee. The Rules, however, require that the order of reference to a 
sub-committee must clearly state the point(s) for investigation. A committee has the power to 
send for persons, papers and records. No document submitted to a committee can be 
withdrawn or altered without its knowledge. The constitution also authorises the parliament 
to confer on committees’ powers for enforcing the attendance of witness, and examining 
them on oath and also for compelling the production of documents. Paradoxically the 
parliament, rather than taking measures to give effect to these provisions, has empowered the 
government to decline to produce a document on the grounds that its disclosure would be 
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the state.i Committee members enjoy immunity for 
whatever they say and/or the way they vote. Committees, however, meet in private; their 
proceedings are kept confidential.  
 
Structure of Parliamentary Committees:  
 
28. The JS has traditionally set up three types of committees: standing committees, select 
committees and special committees. The main difference between different committees 
centres on their nature of appointment. Standing committees are relatively permanent; they 
are normally constituted for the duration of the parliament. Special and select committees are 
ad hoc bodies; they cease to exist when their job is completed. Standing committees are 
generally classified into a number of categories, the most important of which are 
departmentally-related committees, referred to here as oversight committees. The other 
categories are scrutinising committees, financial committees and house committees. 
Appendix 5 shows the nature and number of committees set up by different parliaments in 
independent Bangladesh. 
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Composition of Committees 
 
29.  The nature of composition of different committees, a natural rule, varies. However, while the 
number of members of different standing committees are fixed by the Rules, the House 
decides on the number of members to be appointed to a select committee or a special 
committee. Most standing committees (87%) have ten members. The PAC, however, remains 
an exception; it has fifteen members. Among the committees only a few can be regarded as 
backbench committees. There is no legal restriction, as is the case in Britain and other 
western democracies, on ministers and other front-benchers such as whips, becoming 
members of different committees. Until recently, ministers even headed the oversight 
committees. The seventh parliament has changed the Rules, replacing the Minister as the 
chairman of the DPC by a backbencher. Each of the (35) standing committees on Ministries 
is now headed by a ruling party MP excepting one chaired by an opposition member. But 
ministers are not totally excluded from the committees. They have been made their members. 
Technocrat minsters- those who are not MPs- can participate in committee meetings but 
cannot vote. This change has been made mainly to give effect to an electoral commitment 
made by the present Prime Minister on the eve of the seventh parliamentary elections in 
1996. Since the Bangladesh liberation in 1971, ministers cannot claim ex-officio membership 
of several committees such as the PAC, the PEC, the PUC and the Petition Committee. The 
Rules state that a Minister shall not be appointed a member of any of these committees; if a 
member, after his appointment to the committee is made a Minister, (s)he shall cease to be a 
member of the committee from the date of such appointment.  
 
Characteristics of Committee Members:  
 
30. The membership of different committees in the seventh JS apparently has been distributed on 
a more  ‘rational’ basis than in the past. Committees appear to be more ‘compact’ in 
composition now than before. Those having expertise or professional experience in a certain 
field have been appointed to the relevant committee(s). To be specific, doctors now constitute 
half of the members in the Health Committee; while nearly forty per cent of the members of 
the PAC have long experience of government services/professional jobs. One-third of the 
members of the PAC, who can claim more expertise than their colleagues in financial 
management, has also been simultaneously made members of the FC. A comparative account 
of the socio-economic background of the members of the (seven) sample committees is given 
in Appendix-6. It reveals that a solid one-third of members are newcomers to parliamentary 
politics; most of them joined politics in the 1990s. Interestingly, those who have a previous 
background in government job or professional service are beginners in parliamentary politics. 
The majority of members are, however, businessmen/ industrialists.        
 
 Committee Staff:  
 
31. The Parliament Secretariat provides secretarial support to different committees. Each 
committee chairman has a personal assistant; (s)he has been recruited from outside the 
Secretariat. Senior officials who work for committees do not belong to the Parliament 
Secretariat; most of them are on deputation from government. Almost all of them are 
generalists belonging to BCS (Administration) cadre. The existing committee staff in 
parliament is quite small and inadequate; only a few can claim any specialisation. Whatever 
attempts has been made so far to enlarge the operational capacity of the of the Parliament 
Secretariat, it has remained largely limited. Lack of continuity in the recruitment process is 
likely to increase the dependence of the secretariat on staff support from outside. If the staff 
support is considered to be limited, the nature of facilities available to committees is 
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extremely insignificant. In many cases, these do not virtually exist. Some committee chairs, 
on their own, have arranged photocopiers; most committees lack any staff support. Although 
most chairmen have been provided with offices, they, however, lack other services. In the 
absence of the availability of staff and other resources, most committees remain virtually 
handicapped. Although the Rules allowed committees to obtain cooperation and advice from 
any expert outside; rarely do they do so. In fact, many of them do not appear to be much 
aware of the provision in the Rules. Parliamentary committees in Bangladesh compare 
unfavourably with their counterparts in other parliaments, especially in this respect.  
 
Scope of Committee Work:  
 
32. Parliamentary committees in Bangladesh formally enjoy equal status; some committees are, 
however, ‘more equal’ than others. In particular, as observed earlier, the financial committees 
and the oversight committees appear to have a better potential than others, especially in 
making the government behave. The PAC, which predates the other committees, has to check 
a number of things: that the moneys shown in the accounts as having been disbursed are 
legally available for, and applicable to the service or purpose to which they have been applied 
or charged; that the expenditure conforms to the authority which conforms it; and that every 
re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under 
rules framed by competent authority. The Rules, framed by the first parliament in 1974, 
empowered it to examine also the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure 
of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the 
CAG either under the directions of the President or by a statute of Parliament. No change 
were made in the terms of reference of the PAC for nearly two decades, especially until the 
election of the fifth JS which empowered it to report on the irregularities and lapses of 
different institutions of government and to suggest measures for rectification. 
 
33. The nature of functions (to be) performed by the PUC, originally defined by the Rules in 
1974, also remained the same until 1992, when some important modifications were made. 
The PUC is now required to report to parliament on remedy of irregularities and lapses of 
public undertakings and to recommend measures to free the institutions from corruption. The 
Rules originally provided that the functions of the PUC would be to examine the reports and 
accounts of the public undertakings and to check if affairs of the public undertakings are 
being managed in accordance with sound business principles and prudent commercial 
practices. The Committee, however, cannot examine and investigate matters of government 
policy as distinct from business or commercial functions of public undertakings or matters of 
day-to-day administration. Nor can it scrutinise the activities of banks, although they are 
categorised as public undertakings.  
 
34. The scope of operation of the PEC has remained the same since it was first set up in 1974. 
Article 235 of the Rules provides that the functions of the PEC shall be: to report what 
economies, improvements in organization, efficiency or administrative reform, consistent 
with the policy underlying the estimate, may be effected; to suggest alternative policies in 
order to bring about efficiency and economy in administration; to examine whether the 
money is well laid out within the limits of policy implied in the estimates; and to suggest the 
form in which estimates shall be presented to the House. The Committee can also continue 
the examination of the estimates from time to time throughout the financial year and report to 
the House as its examination proceeds. The demands for grants, however, may be voted 
notwithstanding the fact that the Committee has made no report.  
 
 17
 
 
 
 
 
35. Comparatively speaking, more (significant) changes have been made in the (formal) nature of 
power and authority of the oversight committees. The Rules, first framed in 1974, empowered 
them to examine draft bills and other legislative proposals, review the enforcement of laws 
and propose measures for such enforcement and examine such other matters referred to them 
by the JS. These, however, did not require committees to meet at any specific interval. The 
Chairman, who was also the Minister, took the decision on committee meetings. He was not 
under any obligation to regularly convene meetings of the committee. The fifth parliament 
amended the Rules in 1992, requiring each oversight committee to meet at least once in a 
month, failing which the Speaker could convene meetings of the defaulting committees. 
Committees can also now seek and obtain expert advice from outside. More importantly, the 
various oversight committees have been granted some deterrent powers- the power to review 
the works relating to a ministry which fall within its jurisdiction and in particular, to inquire 
into any activity or irregularity and serious complaints in respect of the ministry and examine, 
if it deems fit, any matters that fall within its jurisdiction and to make recommendations. This 
could be seen as an important departure from the past and might set apart the Bangladesh 
parliament from other parliaments in the region. The financial committees in Bangladesh also 
have more investigative powers than similar bodies in the region.    
 
The Working of Committees 
 
36. There are several ways of measuring the nature of activism of a parliamentary committee. 
Some of the important measures are the frequency at which committee meetings are held, the 
regularity of members' attendance, the number of reports prepared over a particular time, the 
number of hours spent on deliberation, the scope for agenda setting by members, the nature of 
issues raised and discussed and the quality of decisions reached. The list is not obviously 
exhaustive but the measures referred to here are generally considered as important. The 
following tables provide a summary account of the nature of activism of different 
committees. They show that substantial differences can be noticed not only in the nature of 
working of different committees (Table 1); variations can also be found in the working 
pattern of the same (sets of) committees over time (Table 2). 
 
Table 1     Nature of Committee Activism 
 
Nature of Activism PAC PEC PUC FC EC HC P&TC 
% of Members 
Government 
Opposition 
 
60.0 
40.0 
 
60.0 
40.0 
 
60.0 
40.0 
 
60.0 
40.0 
 
60.0 
40.0 
 
50.0 
50.0 
 
60.0 
40.0 
Nature of Member Attendance 46.3 54.0 76.0  71.2 63.5 72.0 
Number of Meetings Held 89 23 20 18 22 42 15 
Number of Bills Scrutinised NA NA NA 5 9 3 - 
Number of Inquiries Made/ 
Underway 
- 7 3 1 1 3 3 
Number of Reports Prepared* 3 - - - - - - 
NA: Not Applicable 
*Exclude reports on bills 
 
 
Table 2   Nature of Committee Activism (Financial Committees Only) 
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Nature of Activism Comm- 
ittee 
  Parlia- 
ment 
   
  First Second Third Fourth Fifth Seventh 
Number of Meetings Held PAC  
PEC 
PUC      
3 
9 
- 
9 
7 
63 
- 
- 
- 
6 
NA 
36 
52 
26 
48 
89 
23 
20 
        
Number of Subcommittees 
Formed 
PAC 
PEC 
PUC 
- 
- 
- 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
4 
NA 
3 
4 
- 
4 
 
1 
7 
3 
Number of Reports Prepared PAC 
PEC 
PUC 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
2 
- 
3 
4 
- 
2 
3 
- 
- 
 
 
Financial Committees 
 
Public Accounts Committee:  
 
37. Comparatively speaking, the PAC of the seventh parliament, headed by S. M. Akram 
(hereafter referred to as Akram Committee), appears to be more active than most of its 
predecessors. It has devised some different, albeit important, ways of working. For example, 
unlike its predecessors, which mostly examined the CAG reports that were more than a 
decade old, the Akram Committee is examining both current and old audit reports. In its first 
policy planning meeting, the Committee decided to examine the audit reports for 1987-88, as 
the earlier committees scrutinised the reports until 1986-87. It was also decided at that 
meeting that the Committee would start reviewing the reports for 1994-95 after six months. In 
fact, it has already examined some of the reports for 1996-7. In particular, a large number of 
special audit reports submitted to the parliament until 1998 have already been scrutinised by 
the committee. It has also suggested the introduction of performance audit and value for 
money audit on a selective basis in various government organizations and projects. As a first 
step, it has suggested that it may be introduced in 1% of the (nearly 22,000) organizations 
annually audited by the CAG. Some organizations have already adopted these new types of 
auditing. This can be seen a significant improvement over the past and is expected to set in 
motion a new trend in financial accountability of government departments. The dominant 
practice has been to undertake ‘compliance’ auditing. The Akram Committee also decided to 
set up an action taken committee to monitor the implementation of decisions taken by it; it 
also initially decided to set up task forces consisting of 4-5 members to scrutinise the audit 
reports for 1983-84 and before. Both these decisions are yet to be implemented because of 
several reasons, especially because of lack of staff support and the time constraint faced by 
members. 
 
38. The Akram Committee disposed of 497 audit objections and comments involving a total 
amount of Tk 17,630 million until November 1998. The objections disposed of represent 
0.88% of the total. It is probably relevant to mention here that the total number of objections 
and comments made in different CAG reports were 56,412. Only a small percentage of total 
objections has been discussed and disposed of. These compare unfavourably with the PAC of 
the fifth parliament, which disposed of a total of 1159 audit objections. This comparison is, 
however, intended to serve heuristic purposes; these may not be seen as a valid comparison. 
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What is especially important to note is the extent to which the difference is significant, 
especially from the standpoint of influencing the behaviour of the defaulting organizations. 
We shall discuss it in a subsequent section.      
 
Public Undertakings Committee:  
 
39. The PUC can be seen as comparatively less active than the other financial committees, 
especially PAC. A part of the reason is that the Committee has had more turn over of 
members than the other committees. Moreover, following the appointment of its first 
Chairman Professor Rafiqul Islam as a State Minister, the Committee did not have a chairman 
for a substantial period of time. In fact, the PUC did not meet for fifteen months. Until now it 
has scrutinised some aspects of the working of nine organizations: DESA, PDB, Titas Gas, 
NCTB, BTB, Petrobangla, BWDB, RAJUK and Steel and Engineering Corporation. Among 
them, DESA and PDB have received the most attention of members. In fact, problems 
confronting these two organizations have routinely come up for discussion in most of the 
meetings of the committee. The issue that has received special prominence is 'system loss' in 
both organizations. Reasons accounting for the loss and the measures needed to overcome the 
problem have been explored. Two special reasons- corruption and trade unionism- have been 
identified as the main stumbling block to the efficient management of these organizations. 
 
40. The nature of other issues discussed has varied considerably. The PUC has apparently given 
more stress on administrative (occasionally policy) issues. But financial issues per se have 
not received any important attention. The members of the PUC have not shown any interest 
in checking the annual reports or books of accounts or other financial records of different 
enterprises. Even the large number of audit objections raised in CAG reports have not yet 
been settled. To be specific, there are 10, 906 and 23,250 unsettled audit objections in the 
DESA and PDB respectively. None is keen to settle these objections. Nor has the PUC ever 
asked the defaulting organizations to clarify on their inability to respond to audit inquiries. 
Most of the members apparently did not find the discussion of audit objections rewarding; 
only one member was seen as very critical of the inability of different organizations to follow 
government rules in this respect, suggesting that the problem be resolved as soon as possible.  
 
41. The PUC, until now, has undertaken what may appropriately be called ‘information 
gathering’ function more than exercising oversight; It is, however, not argued that 
‘information-seeking’ is unimportant; in fact, information is crucially important in evolving a 
general strategy for exercising oversight. The nature of questions asked of officials do not 
necessarily lack depth; to the contrary, many of the questions asked or the information sought 
directly focus on accountability, requiring the officials to defend their actions. What is, 
however, observed here is that the measures that have been taken to strengthen/exercise 
oversight remains far from satisfactory. For example, the PUC set up a sub-committee to 
inquire into the irregularities in awarding contracts to a particular organization named Russel 
and Co. to supply papers for printing text books for free distribution to school children. Initial 
information collected by the committee showed that there was a clear breach of rule in taking 
decisions on this issue. In fact, although the majority of members of the tender committee 
were opposed to the proposal for awarding of contract to Russel and Co., the Chairman of 
National Curriculum and Training Board (NCTB) gave a casting vote, when there was not 
any tie at all, and illegally allowed the company to supply the paper. The sub-committee, 
which was given the responsibility to frame its terms of reference, has not yet submitted any 
report. What is interesting to note is that while the inquiry against it was underway, it was 
given another work order to supply additional paper for which it has already been given full 
payment. But the company has failed to supply the required paper within the deadline set by 
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the authority. Two other sub-committees formed to inquire into specific problems are also yet 
to report to the committee. Some changes in the style of working of the PUC can also be 
noticed. 
Estimates Committee:  
 
42. Among the financial committees, the PEC has traditionally remained very inactive. Although 
different parliaments have routinely set up the EC, none has yet produced any report. Nor 
does its activity receive any special recognition. But, theoretically speaking, it has a better 
potential than the other committees to ensure fiscal discipline and economy in expenditure. 
The PEC can suo moto examine any estimate; herein lies its main strength. Until recently, this 
potential remained mostly untapped. The PEC has had a new beginning since the election of 
the present parliament. What separates most the PEC from other committees, for example, the 
PAC, is that it can check the estimates throughout the financial year and, in particular, before 
the expenditure is incurred; it also can suggest the economic use of resources. On the other 
hand, the PAC, as observed earlier, inquires into lapses after monies have been spent. As a 
strategy to check the misuse of resources and embezzlement of public fund, the present PEC 
has stressed on scrutinising the estimates (and use) of development expenditure. The 
committee has identified two important areas- appointment of consultants/contractors and 
awarding of contracts- where lapses in financial transactions are likely to be most evident. 
There is relatively greater scope for hiatus between the estimated expenditure and the actual 
expenditure in these two areas. As a first step towards strengthening its surveillance over the 
process of evaluating tenders and appointing consultants/contractors, the PEC issued a 
circular in June 1997, requiring different organizations to supply it copies of: 
 
a) Terms of Reference (TOR) before consultants are appointed; 
b) Comparative statements of evaluation of tenders and resolutions before consultants are 
appointed. 
 
a) Schedules of tenders before advertisements are made for appointment of transport 
contractors (transport expenses involving more than TK. 1 million); 
b) Comparative statement of evaluation of tenders and resolution after tenders have been 
accepted for the appointment of transport contractors (transport expenses involving more than 
TK. 1 million). 
 
a) Schedules of tenders before advertisements are made for the appointment of purchase & 
sale contractors (more than TK. 10 million); 
b) Comparative statement of evaluation of tenders and resolution after tenders have been 
accepted for the appointment of purchase and sale contractors (more than TK. 10 million). 
 
a) Schedules of tenders before advertisements are made for the appointment of contractors for 
undertaking civil works (more than TK. 50 million); 
b) Comparative statement of evaluation of tenders and resolution after tenders have                                 
been accepted for the appointment of contractors for undertaking civil works (more than   Tk. 
50 million  
 
43. Most of the organizations, which initially received the letter, did not look upon it with favour; 
many even did not take notice of it. The letter also created some confusion, with some even 
questioning the intention of the committee. Some ministers have even gone to the extent of 
writing to the Speaker, challenging the authority of the chairman to ask for such information. 
In more than one instance, the Speaker has asked for clarification. But the PEC has remained 
steadfast, compiling cases of corruption and misappropriation in different organizations and 
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conducting preliminary inquiries into the irregularities in the spending patterns of various 
organizations. Among the various inquiries it has made, three deserve special mention. First, 
the pEC detected massive corruption in accepting tender bids worth TK. 100 crores for 
purchase of medical equipment for government hospitals, medical colleges and training 
institutions. The PEC identified the project Management Unit as responsible for irregularities 
in accepting tenders at a much higher rate than the original estimate. In one case it was found 
that the lowest bid price was about 50 per cent higher than the estimated cost; while in 
another case, the bid prices was 100 per cent higher than the estimated cost. It also found that 
some of the bids failed to fulfil specifications set by the management, but those came out to 
be responsive (successful). After the preliminary probe, the PEC submitted the report to the 
State Minister for Health, recommending measures for rectifying the problem.   
 
44. The PEC has also detected large-scale corruption and misappropriation of funds in the 
implementation of the TK. 123 crore Environmental Development Project (EDP) undertaken 
by Dhaka City Corporation (DCC). The Director of the project not only refuted the charges 
labelled against him; he even termed the inquiry as politically motivated. What is especially 
important to note is that the officials even requested the government for a review and 
enhancement of the cost to TK. 270 crores. The project officials even managed a petition 
from some local people to enhance their claim for more money. The PEC formed a sub-
committee, with A.S.M. Firoz as its chairman, in September 1999 to further probe into the 
allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds in the EDP. The sub-committee held 
five meetings and submitted a report, based on the review of original files and documents in 
February 2000, confirming the findings of the preliminary inquiry made by the EC Chairman. 
Appendix 7 provides some details of the nature of corruption found in the implementation of 
the EDP.  
 
45. The PEC has also identified various irregularities including embezzlement of TK 20 crore in 
the procurement of paper by the NCTB for printing primary school text books.  A local 
company- Russel and Co. Ltd. (RCL)- was initially awarded a contract by the NCTB to 
supply 8630 tonnes of paper within 180 days. The RCL was paid $985.52 per tonne, although 
the rate initially set was $ 635 per tonne. More importantly, the company was paid for the 
whole order (8630 tonnes), although it did not supply 232.58 tonnes at all. Worse even, rather 
than penalising the RCL, the NCTB gave a work order to it in February 1999 for supplying 
3000 tonnes of paper. But the company failed this time too, supplying only 1558 tonnes of 
paper one month after the deadline, although the entire price of the paper was paid.      
 
46. The above cases are illustrative; not exhaustive. The PEC has compiled a list of irregularities 
for each ministry; in monetary terms, the loss incurred appears to be staggering. Appendix 8 
provides details of information on the nature and scale of financial embezzlement in several 
projects undertaken by the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education under 
the Ministry of Education. The PEC has already set up six more sub-committees to probe into 
corruption and irregularities in several other organizations. Appendix 9 provides details of 
different sub-committees. Most of them have been set up only very recently; only a few have 
started working. But their constitution itself reveals the extent of seriousness with which the 
PEC has started its work. The actual impact of the EC scrutiny as well as other committees 
will be explored in the next section.  
 
47. The PEC has not made any major review of the budget proposals or details of estimates (of 
revenue expenditure) of different departments. The Chairman of the Committee, however, 
has argued that no tangible achievement can be made through scrutinising the budget 
(including supplementary budget), but a lot of anomalies can be detected through examining 
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the procedures involved in the implementation of development projects. In particular, a huge 
sum of public money can be saved if micro-level estimates of expenditure rather than macro-
level estimates are scrutinised. The Chairman has further argued that since a Public 
Administration Reform Commission (PARC) is at present reviewing the administrative 
system as a whole, it would be a duplication of effort to stress on this function.        
 
48. Comparatively speaking, the three financial committees in the seventh parliament appear to 
be more active than their predecessors, meeting more frequently and exploring alternative 
ways of strengthening their surveillance. In particular, they are seen to be more willing to use 
their deterrent power- the power to inquire. Comparative experience shows that the dominant 
method used by committees in the West is to frequently conduct inquiries into the 
irregularities in different departments. Rarely did the financial committees in Bangladesh use 
this power in the past. They, however, trail behind their counterparts in reporting to the 
House. One chairman has observed that political factors often discourage committees 
submitting reports to the House on a regular basis; while the main reason identified by all is 
the lack of staff and resources.  However, as observed latter, unless the government is willing 
to respond to the recommendations of committees, rarely can the committee scrutiny have 
any real impact. One of the important factors accounting for a surge in the activism of 
financial committees is the readiness of their chairmen to spend more time in committee-
related activity. Some of them can be considered as full-timers, attending their offices 
regularly.  
 
Oversight Committees: 
 
49. Like the financial committees, the scale of activism of the oversight committees has also 
varied, with some meeting more regularly and probing more deeply into the activities of 
different executive agencies, than the others. Among the four sample oversight committees, 
the FC has held the maximum number of meetings, averaging 18 (meetings) per year. Until 
now, the FC has scrutinised the activities of several organizations, especially different banks 
and other financial institutions, the National Board of Revenue (NBR), the External Relations 
Division (ERD) and the Stock Exchange Commission (SEC). It has explored a number of 
issues such as the nature of functions performed by different organizations, the nature of 
problems they face, the measures taken so far to overcome them. However, while the 
committee has discussed the difficulty of raising revenue in more than one meeting, there has 
not been any specific reference to the importance of exercising control over public 
expenditure. In fact, expenditure control, as the Rules of Business of GOB show, is one of the 
important functions of the Ministry of Finance. But the FC, which parallels the Ministry and 
is charged with checking the way it performs this function, has apparently overlooked it. 
Although the issues of corruption and mismanagement of resources by different organizations 
have been discussed in different meetings, no concrete step has yet been taken to probe into 
these lapses. Nor do the officials appear to be receptive to the idea of setting up inspection 
teams/inquiries to check irregularities.                            
 
50. The FC, however, has very often discussed the scope and limits of the alternative ways of 
recovering loans from the defaulters. Yet, paradoxically speaking, it itself has now become 
involved in a row with the Ministry of Finance (MF) over the issue of accepting application 
for fresh loans from a bank loan defaulter. The conflict between the MF and the FC started 
immediately after the FC, on a petition from Fazlur Rahman, one big loan defaulter, directed 
the Sonali Bank and the Bangladesh Bank to reschedule his loan and to grant him fresh loans. 
This decision infuriated the Finance Minister who sent a letter to the FC Chairman, stating 
that it did not have the power to address the businessman’s case without a parliamentary 
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referral. The Minister also consulted the Attorney General (AG), who observed that the FC 
did not have the power to consult the applicant’s case. What the AG suggested was that the 
committee could investigate the case/issue if the matter was referred to it by parliament. The 
FC considered the reaction of the Minister as derogatory; it adopted a resolution in one of its 
meetings, condemning the Minister for making adverse comment against it. The members of 
the FC also termed the Minister’s remarks as a ‘direct threat’ to the democratic practice. 
What the FC subsequently argued was that it did not take any decision about the loan 
rescheduling of the Rahman group; rather it discussed the decision taken by the Board of 
Directors of the Sonali Bank regarding the Rahman group’s loans.  
 
51. It is, however, to be mentioned here that the FC has apparently had more problems with the 
Minister than the other committees. Although the latter also do not find ministers always 
helpful, rarely do they engage in any open conflict with them. But the FC appears to be an 
exception. It expressed serious dismay more than once at the absence of the Minister from 
committee meetings despite being invited to attend them. In one of its meetings held in early 
1998, the FC refused to accept an unsigned paper submitted by the Secretary. The 
observations of the Secretary were also expunged from the proceedings of the FC.   
 
52. The HC and P&TC, which have trailed behind the FC in holding meetings, can be seen as 
actively using their deterrent power more often, probing into the irregularities in different 
executive agencies. The HC, for example, has so far set up three inquiry committees to 
identify lapses in the planning and administration of different health (related) programmes. 
Perhaps the best know and widely publicised is the inquiry into the irregularities in 
purchasing medical equipment earlier detected by the PEC. The HC, on 20 January 1998, set 
up a sub-committee with Professor Amanullah MP, the State Minister for Health as 
Chairman, to check the irregularities in the implementation of the Second Health and Family 
Planning Services (SHFPS) project. The other two members were the ruling party MP Dr 
Iqbal and the opposition JP MP Tajul Islam. The sub-committee asked the Project 
Management Unit (PMU) to explain the irregularities labelled against it, but it failed to give 
replies to at least 37 queries. The sub-committee had also several difficulties in collecting 
many relevant information from the PMU; it even threatened once to sue the officials of the 
PMU in the Bureau of Anti Corruption (BAC) if they (PMU) failed to provide the necessary 
information/document. The sub-committee confirmed the findings of the preliminary inquiry 
conducted by the PEC Chairman. In its report submitted to the HC in April 1998, the sub-
committee recommended retendering for packages I and 2, and for awarding packages 3 and 
4 to the lowest bidder. Although the HC accepted the recommendations, they were 
nevertheless honoured in the breach for reasons to be explored subsequently. 
 
53. Suffice it to note that the HC also detected massive corruption in the procurement of medical 
and surgical equipment by civil surgeons (CSs), who were alleged to have misappropriated 
Tk. 20 crore. The CSs were in charge of procuring medical accessories, furniture and fittings 
for hospitals. The HC set up a three-member sub-committee with JP M.P Tajul Islam as its 
chairman. It found that the CSs misappropriated the money over a five-year period. There 
were many cases of gross irregularities. For example, tube lights were bought at Tk. 650 a 
piece, whereas its maximum retail price was Tk. 100; a 25-watt bulb was bought for Tk. 650; 
while 100-watt bulbs had been purchased at Tk. 1400 each; a Tk. 5000 centrifugal machine 
was bought for Tk. 27000, and a three-inch microphone cost Tk. 11500 against its market 
price of Tk. 450. There were numerous examples of overspending and misappropriation by 
the civil surgeons. Following the detection of such corruption and misappropriation, the HC 
recommended that the concerned civil surgeons along with one deputy secretary and senior 
assistant secretary and other persons including concerned officials of the finance ministry be 
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suspended and departmental action be taken. The meeting also decided that anti-corruption 
cases be initiated against these officials and actions against contractors who supplied goods 
should also be taken. But the task of punishing the recalcitrant officials remains difficult for 
reasons to be explored in a subsequent section.                  
 
54. Besides probing into some of the cases of irregularities/lapses that have important financial 
implications, the HC has also deliberated over a number of other issues. Those that have 
received important attention of members include the unauthorised absence of doctors from 
local hospitals, the reluctance of doctors to work in rural hospitals, the problem of absorbing 
a large number of project officials/employees on a permanent basis, allegations of corruption 
against the project director of 300-bed (health) project in Suhrawardy Hospital, purchase of a 
huge number of birth control pills for four years at a time, and allegations of corruption in 
distributing medicine. Many of these issues deserved further inquiry and attention, in fact, 
had there been a serious probe, many irregularities could certainly have been unearthed. But 
these did not receive any serious consideration. These were routinely discussed; while the 
Ministry was asked to look into the issues. No attempt has so far been made to check the 
extent to which corrective actions have been taken.  
 
55. The P&TC has remained comparatively less active; it has met far less regularly than the other 
committees, especially the FC. The committee, however, has discussed a number of issues 
such as corruption and irregularities in the T&T Board, award of contracts without tender, 
and signing of contract with private companies for providing telephone facilities and services 
in a nontransparent manner. Many members expressed dismay at the ways contracts were 
signed with Grameen Phone, Seba, Alkatel- all now providing telephone services. Some also 
asked for the contract documents and accordingly it was decided that all papers relating to the 
signing of contract with the above-named companies would be made available in the next 
meeting. But only a few documents were actually made available, which the members found 
as incomplete. The Secretary of the Ministry was apparently reluctant to produce all the 
documents arguing that the members could not have unrestricted access to them. What he 
suggested was that if any member had any specific objection against any company or/and if 
he wanted to see any specific document, then those specific documents could be made 
available. The P&TC, however, subsequently set up an eight-member sub-committee to 
check the extent to which irregularities have taken place in this respect. The issue of 
corruption in the T&T Board has surfaced in more than one meeting. Accordingly, a five-
member inquiry committee was formed to inquire into the allegations of corruption against 
the Board. The committee is headed by AL Whip Mizanur Rahman Manu and composed of 
two members each from the treasury and opposition benches. None of the committees, 
however, has yet produced any report; the time limit for submitting reports has been extended 
up to the end of April 2000.        
 
56. Meanwhile, members have also alleged irregularities in awarding contracts for the installation 
of 189,000 digital telephone lines. It was decided in one of the meetings that all members 
would be supplied copies of all documents including tender documents related to the project 
within seven days. Some members even suggested that the project work should remain 
suspended until the committee had deliberated over this issue. But the Minister was not 
apparently ready to discuss it when the issue resurfaced in the next meeting held on 20 
December 1999, arguing that since the work had already commenced, it would not be 
advisable to stop it, temporarily or otherwise. Nor could any discussion take place on the 
tender for 215000 telephone lines because of the absence of the Minister.  
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57. The EC remains the least-active among the oversight committees. Although it has held more 
meetings than the P&TC, the nature of oversight activity it has exercised, in a sense, lacked 
both depth and focus. Although it has routinely examined the working of different executive 
agencies under the Ministry of Education, the nature of issues raised and discussed do not 
appear to have much policy or financial significance. It has discussed, more as a matter of 
routine, the irregular appointment of teachers in primary schools, corruption and irregularities 
of officials in different education boards and the National University, and the problems facing 
the universities. One of the opposition members in the EC raised the issue of embezzlement 
and misappropriation of funds in NCTB but the committee did not apparently take into 
cognizance the likely implications of such irregularities. The Minister was seen to be critical 
of the member naming the company from whom the paper for printing primary school text 
books were procured. No major decisions have so far been taken by the EC that deserve 
special mention. Like the PUC, the EC has so far mostly performed ‘information seeking’ 
function.  
 
58. The different oversight committees, as the discussion above shows, have differed from each 
other in several respects such as the number of meetings held and the nature of issues 
discussed. They, however, share some characteristics also. For example, none of the 
committees has exercised its permissive power in a balanced way. Each committee has 
stressed on overseeing the activities of some agencies more than others. For example, the FC 
has given more emphasis on banks than on other organizations; while the EC deliberated 
more often on the problems facing the primary and mass education sector than higher 
education. The HC has focused more on the activities of the Directorate of Health than the 
Directorate of family Planning; while the P&TC has spent less than ten per cent of its time 
examining the working of the postal department. None of the oversight committees has ever 
sought to examine the ways funds for different services or programmes have been allocated 
or spent. Although the Rules do not specifically require such committees to examine the 
expenditure of different ministries that they shadow, neither do they bar them from doing so. 
In general, this issue does not interest the members. But, like the financial committees, most 
of the oversight committees have also played a more pro-active role than their predecessors.  
 
 
Limits of Committee Influence 
 
 
59. This section provides a summary account of the significance of committees, specifying the 
extent to which they have had any impact on the dominant pattern of behaviour of different 
actors and agencies. One important measure is to see the extent to which various government 
departments/ organizations faithfully comply with the directives/suggestions of different 
committees. It is probably relevant to mention here that committees generally do not possess 
any executive power; what they can mostly do is to recommend actions for improvement. 
They lack any formal authority to enforce their recommendations/decisions. Much of what 
they can actually do depends upon the ways other important actors in the political arena, in 
particular, the government, and the chamber that appoint them, perceive their role. When the 
committees are evaluated by "pre-ordained objectives", they can not be considered a major 
success. One exception is probably the PAC, which has performed better than the other 
committees. It has, in fact, had greater success in influencing the behaviour of recalcitrant 
officials and agencies.  
 
60. Following the recommendation of the PAC, an amount of TK. 2040 million has been 
recovered to the exchequer and TK. 9050 million has been adjusted. This seems to be an 
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extra-ordinary success. In the case of objections and comments relating to TK. 5804 million, 
the Ministries have been asked to take departmental actions and inform the PAC. The 
Committee has also decided to rediscuss audit objections and comments relating to TK. 300 
million at an appropriate time; while a certain amount has been written off. Following the 
recommendations of the Committee, issue-based audit has been undertaken by the Audit 
department as a first step towards introducing performance audit and value for money audit. 
Besides, unlike the past, the present PAC has not ever made any complaints of non-
compliance. In fact, it has noted with satisfaction that officials are now more careful not to 
sideline its recommendations. In one of its report, the PAC has observed that two secretaries 
of the government who, according to the Rules of Business are Principal Accounting Officers 
of their Ministries, apologised to it in writing for their inability to attend meetings of the 
committee. Never before in the past in Bangladesh’s history did any senior official behave 
such ways.  
 
61. One opposition parliamentarian has referred to the presence of skilled parliamentarians as 
Members of the PAC and the good understanding between themselves as one of the most 
important reasons for its success. There are also several other factors that have influenced the 
way it has worked; perhaps the most important is the leadership role of its Chairman to which 
reference has already been made in an earlier section. Another important factor accounting 
for the relative success of the PAC is its attempt to follow up decisions and to monitor them. 
As can be seen from Appendix 10, many ministries have been asked to appear more than 
once before the PAC to settle audit objections; this gives an opportunity to the Committee to 
check the implementation status of decisions taken in earlier meetings. The PAC has already 
formally held a number of meetings to assess the status of implementation of decisions taken 
until now. This has an important implication. Ministries now realise that they have to appear 
before the PAC on a regular basis. This works as a deterrent, influencing them to change, at 
least up to a certain extent, their traditional habit of not responding to the call to settle audit 
objections. Also the decision of the committee, taken in its second policy planning meetings, 
to refer the issue of non-compliance by ministries/individuals to higher bodies such as the 
Cabinet, and to the JS recommending discussion on it and for resolution condemning the 
defaulters, apparently work as an important deterrent. The Chairman of the PAC has observed 
that the old habit of Ministries is changing gradually, although slowly. He has, however, 
argued that without a strong staff support, the Committee cannot go much beyond a certain 
limit. Had there been a better staff support, the Committee could have moved much faster.      
 
62. The above discussion is, however, not to idealise the role of the PAC. Nor is it to suggest that 
there is no scope for improvement. In fact, there is still a strong case for revamping the PAC 
to make it an effective ‘watchdog’. The Committee has, however, noted with regret that many 
organizations did not take any preliminary step to settle audit objections even 12 years after 
these were first raised. Among the ministries that took more than ten years or more are the 
Ministries of Food, Foreign Affairs, Jute and Agriculture; while the Ministry of Local 
Government took the lowest time (20 months) to respond to audit objections. In its first 
report, the present PAC observed that the number of audit objections and comments that are 
not usually included in the C&AG report and those that remain unsettled appeared to be 
extremely high. Their number has increased over time and if proper measures were not taken 
to ensure that they did not happen on a regular basis, there would be a serious break down in 
the financial management of the country. In order to expedite the process of settling both 
types of audit objections the PAC has suggested the creation on an audit cell in each 
department/ministry. The PAC of the fifth parliament and a former CAG also recommended 
similar measures but no such steps have yet been taken. 
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63. However, although the effectiveness of the PAC, to some extent, can be measured in 
quantitative terms, the task of identifying the achievements and influence of other committees 
is difficult. One of the most important objectives underlying the parliamentary scrutiny is to 
influence the behaviour of officials, i.e. to make them behave according to legislative intent, 
which is difficult to measure. One way to do so is to see the extent to which the 
ministries/agencies look upon the recommendations/suggestions of different committees with 
respect. Available evidence shows that the ministries do not voluntarily agree to implement 
them. Generally the recommendations made by different committees remain unimplemented. 
Most of the committees have expressed dismay at the slow implementation/non-
implementation of decisions by different ministries. The PUC, for example, once asked for 
reports from nine organizations (whose work it had reviewed), on the implementation of 
decisions taken by it. But only four organizations complied with its decision; while five other 
organizations failed to submit reports. Those who produced reports on time also made them 
in a casual manner. One of the members termed the report of one organization as "absolutely 
bogus". The PUC, like the PAC, have also learnt the ways of enforcing the implementation of 
its recommendations. In one of its meetings held recently, the committee assigned the 
responsibility of assessing the progress of implementation of decisions to four of its 
members, and asked them to submit their reports at the next meeting of the committee. This 
strategy proved somewhat successful. A number of organizations provided detailed reports on 
the implementation of decisions made by the PUC. What is, however, needed is to cross 
check or verify the measures that are said to have been taken by the defaulting organizations. 
But the committees remain seriously handicapped because of lack of staff and other support; 
this, in fact, discourages any major follow up study. Examples from other countries also 
confirm the usefulness of follow up inquiries in making recalcitrant departments/officials 
behave in accordance with the recommendations of parliamentary committees.  
 
64. Secondly, officials/ministries not only often ignore the recommendations of committees; 
some of them also have a tendency to defy their directives. As an example, reference can be 
made to the decisions of the Ministry of Health to approve the signing of contract for TK. 22 
crore package 1 of the ADB-aided health project defying the unanimous decisions of the HC 
for retendering, as observed earlier. What is surprising is that the State Minister for Health, 
who headed the inquiry into the lapses in the tender process and recommended retendering, 
subsequently approved the signing of contract with the bidder originally selected by the 
PMU. This issue (of defiance) was raised in one of the meetings of the HC, when the 
members expressed strong resentment against the decision of the Ministry of Health. Some of 
the members also accused the state minister of playing a 'double-role'; the latter, however, 
argued that he was apparently helpless in the face of the pressure by ADB. He observed that 
the ADB did not agree to the proposal for retendering; it even threatened to withdraw support 
to the project. This issue resurfaced in another meeting of the committee when there was an 
altercation between the minister and his secretary; at one stage the latter called his political 
'boss' a 'liar'.  The HC later decided that if the government, for any reason, could not 
implement its decisions, it must consult the chairman of the committee before taking a 
different decision. The committee would then consider it. The committee considered the 
decision of the state minister as "illogical", although it fell short of censoring him. 
 
65. Thirdly, there are also other examples of defiance by different ministries. Despite repeated 
requests, many ministries do not always make available important documents. Whenever 
supplied, these may remain incomplete in many instances. Different committees have 
cautioned the officials to be careful while submitting documents but the situation has not 
apparently changed to any significant degree. Even many ministers are also seen to be hostile 
to the proposal for supplying documents and files to committees. The PEC has apparently 
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faced more resistance than the other committees in collecting important documents. Other 
committees (not included in the sample), for example, the Energy and Mineral Resources 
Committee and the Defence Committee, have also complained of the difficulties of having 
access to documents. The problem of forcing attendance and in particular, the production of 
documents, is not a peculiar Bangladeshi characteristic; committees in advanced democracies 
also face this type of problem.  
 
66. Fourthly, an important factor limiting the effectiveness of committees is a lack of consistency 
between the issues discussed in committee meetings and the decisions actually taken. 
Discussion in committee meetings often does not proceed according to the agenda. Issues not 
originally included in the agenda often dominate discussion in committee meetings. Officials, 
who outnumber the members, very often overburden the latter with statistics and data in such 
a way that they may find them very difficult to digest. Members also have complained that 
they are very often supplied many papers that are unnecessary; while many important 
documents are being withheld. Some have also complained that officials send working papers 
to them very late, usually a day or two before a meeting is scheduled to be held; this does not 
allow the members to do any homework before attending committee meetings, which many 
find as a disadvantage. 
 
67. Fifthly, lack of communication between different committees is an important factor, limiting 
the effectiveness of committees. It is thus not uncommon to find different committees 
working at cross purposes. As an example, reference can be made to the scrutiny of activities 
of the NCTB by the PEC, the PUC and the EC. All three have examined the issue of 
awarding contracts to Russell and Company for supplying paper for printing primary school 
text books. The PUC, as already observed, set up a committee to inquire into the (wrong) way 
decisions were taken to award the contract to the company; while the EC discussed the issue 
in one of its meetings but did not take any decision in this respect. The PEC first detected the 
misappropriation and embezzlement of funds by Russell and Company; its findings have 
recently been reported in the press. Had there been coordination between different 
committees, it would have been possible to save time, energy and resources. There is thus a 
clear case for inter-committee consultation, especially between different financial committees 
and between the PEC and the oversight committees. In particular, the PEC findings can 
provide staple diet to the oversight committees, if they are willing to inquire into the lapses of 
the ministries they parallel. The HC inquiry into the irregularities in the implementation of 
the TK. 100 crore Second Health Service Project made on the basis of the preliminary inquiry 
report by the PEC provides a major case example. As a first step towards such coordination, 
the PEC may make available its preliminary findings on irregularities and corruption in 
different ministries, requesting further probe.  
 
68. It is, however, difficult to identify the extent to which the different committees will look upon 
each other's role as complementary; whatever limited evidence is available shows that they 
may consider each other as adversary.  As an example, reference can be made to the (over) 
reaction of the HC on the scrutiny of several CMMU (Construction, Maintenance and 
Management Unit) files by the PEC, which apprehended serious irregularities in scrutinising 
applications for the appointment of contractors by the Unit. Some of the members of the HC 
criticised the PEC for refusing to return the files, which had allegedly been lying with it for a 
considerable period of time. The Health Ministry observed that despite repeated requests, the 
PEC refused to return the files. The chairman of the HC also complained that the chairman of 
the PEC misbehaved with him when he asked for the files. The HC directed the ministry 
officials not to make available any files in future to the PEC without its permission and that 
of the Ministry. It also proposed disciplinary actions against those sending papers and 
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documents to the PEC without the permission of the Ministry of Health. A letter subsequently 
addressed to the HC chairman (copy of which was also sent to the Prime Minister) clearly 
showed that the HC had probably overreacted to, what can be called a ‘ploy’ by health 
officials. 
 
69. The HC also expressed strong resentment against the PEC for allegedly interfering with the 
process of purchasing medical equipment amounting TK. 35 million on a World Bank grant. 
The Director of the Central Medical and Storage Department (CMSD) observed that the PEC 
did not allow it to avail of the opportunity. The latter, however, observed that it did not object 
to the purchase of equipment; rather it asked for some clarification on certain issues and 
explanation on several lapses that the CMSD did not do. To the contrary, it remained silent, 
and as a consequence, the project probably lapsed. Documents supplied by the CMSD to the 
PEC clearly show several breaches of rules; there is a clear evidence of the intention of 
embezzlement and misappropriation. The PEC specifically identified several loopholes in the 
tender documents in the presence of CMSD officials and asked them to take corrective 
actions. Rather than doing that, they raised the issue in a meeting of the HC complaining 
against the PEC, thereby seeking to influence the members to adopt a critical view of the role 
of the PEC. Such bureaucratic 'ploys' are likely to discourage inter-committee collaboration 
and rapport. Had the two committees met and discussed the issue, a different picture would 
certainly have emerged. This also calls for a major change in the orientation and attitude of 
the bureaucracy. 
 
70. Sixthly, an important problem that may discourage serious scrutiny is the problem with 
taking disciplinary actions against recalcitrant officials, or those found guilty of serious 
offence such as wastage and misappropriation of public resources. Following the inquiry into 
the misappropriation of public funds by the HC, a number of civil surgeons were removed. 
But the court, on application from some of them, issued a stay order, and asked the Ministry 
to explain the legality of its action. The court also observed that since the aggrieved persons 
were removed on the basis of a parliamentary committee report, which was not placed in the 
parliament and/or approved by the Speaker, this decision warranted legal interpretations. The 
HC, however, differed with this opinion and observed that a parliamentary committee, after 
inquiring into a particular issue/lapse, could recommend to the concerned Ministry for 
corrective actions. There is no need to refer the issue to the House at that stage; however, if a 
particular ministry does not implement the recommendations of a committee, it should then 
report to the House. This issue needs further exploration. 
 
71. Seventhly, an important limitation of the committee scrutiny is that it very often lacks focus. 
Experience shows that the nature of activity undertaken by oversight committees remains 
limited to holding "explanatory dialogues", to borrow Johnson's terminology, between the 
committee members and officials. Officials generally do not appear before committees as 
witnesses; what they mostly do or are being asked to do is to clarify and explain, and not to 
account for their (in)action. The exceptions are few. A part of this defect stems from the 
methods of work followed by oversight committees. Unlike the PEC, which regularly 
conducts inquiries, the dominant practice followed by oversight committees is to convene 
meetings to have a general overview of the activities of the ministries they shadow. It is rare 
for such committees to investigate into the lapses in the working of ministries. In fact, lack of 
willingness of the oversight committees, and to some extent, the PUC, to use their power of 
investigation is one of their main sources of ineffectiveness/weakness. 
 
72. The above discussion is not intended to argue that the committees have miserably failed; to 
the contrary, both sets of committees have fared better than those elected in the past in almost 
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every respect: holding meetings, scrutinising bills, overviewing the activities of ministries 
and conducting inquiries. Among the financial committees, the PAC and the PEC have 
received more attention. The latter (PEC) has, to some extent, become a 'feared' institution. 
Even the opposition members in the committee have lauded its role. Many organizations, as 
the chairmen and members of the committee observe, have become aware of the fact that they 
cannot easily engage in wrong-doing without the risk of being made accountable to it. In 
other words, the existence of this committee can provide a counterweight, influencing many 
defaulting officials to become careful while planning the future course of action.  
 
73. It is, however, difficult to pin down the organizations that have become aware of the risk of 
being called to account by the PEC. Unless ministries take corrective actions against those 
responsible for wrong doing, committees are likely to remain handicapped. The role of the 
ministers is crucially important in this respect. There are some evidences that they have 
become somewhat attentive to some of its suggestions. For example, following the inquiry of 
the PEC into irregularities in purchasing computers under the Primary Education 
Development Project for Dhaka, Rajshahi and Khulna Divisions, the Ministry of Education 
has referred the issue to the Bangladesh Computer Council for opinion; it has recently sent a 
reminder, requesting the Council again to give its comment/opinion on the matter. The 
Primary and Mass Education Division of the Ministry of Education has also set up a 
committee to inquire into the irregularities in the Facilities Department detected by the PEC. 
Many organizations, however, still remain suspicious about the role of the PEC. 
 
Committees in Comparative Perspective 
 
74. Committees are ubiquitous; they exist in all parliaments- large or small, old or new. However, 
notwithstanding an increase in their nature of activism and perhaps impact, committees in the 
Bangladesh parliament compare unfavourably with their counterparts in other Westminster 
systems- India, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. As observed in an earlier 
section, in all of these countries, committees have formally some role in the scrutiny of 
expenditure. In particular, the PAC, which enjoys almost an exalted status in each of these 
countries, has had greater impact than the other committees. Its recommendations are 
conventionally honoured; rarely are they rejected. This gives it the most strength. The PAC is 
both feared and revered. In Britain and other established Westminster systems, the CAG who 
provides the main source of expert advice, is now an officer of parliament. His inquiries 
generate important information for the PAC inquiries. Similarly, the CAG also relies on the 
report of the PAC to generate some political pressure on recalcitrant departments.  
 
75. However, the activity of oversight committees in Britain does not generally focus on 
expenditure. The examination of expenditure, in fact, has received far less attention than the 
other issues. One estimate shows that oversight committees spend only five per cent of their 
time on public spending. Still, only those expenditures, which generally have substantial 
policy content, attract the attention of the members. Comparatively speaking, the scrutiny of 
estimates by the Senate Legislative Committees in Australia appears to be more effective than 
in other countries. Estimates hearing are potentially of great importance as instruments of 
accountability because they provide regular opportunities for the Senate to take advantage of 
the availability of public servants who appear as witness to clarify and explain the quite 
extensive budget and management information prepared by each agency. The Canadian 
oversight committees also go through the departmental estimates with as much scrutiny as 
possible given the timetable.  Although the forms in which estimates are prepared are so 
complex that it would take an expert to understand fully, the review by committees 
nevertheless enables parliament to perform one of its traditional functions, i.e. of keeping an 
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eye on public expenditure. It has the further benefit of forcing the departments to be more 
rigorous in preparing the estimates. Through its committees' review of departmental 
estimates, the House monitors public expenditure before they are incurred. The oversight 
committees in India have to be more active in the scrutiny of estimates, as they are given four 
weeks to do it and to report back to parliament. These committees routinely submit reports on 
the demands for grants of different ministries; the government generally accepts nearly sixty 
per cent of them. Kashyap, however, asserts that the recommendations that are really 
important or of some consequence are not accepted; those that tend to be accepted are those 
which are minor and create no difficulties for anyone or those which are in tune with the 
thinking of the government or the ruling party.   
 
76. Compared with the PAC, the recommendations of the oversight committees in Britain are 
given less importance. Only one-third of the recommendations is accepted. The government 
is, however, now required to respond to the reports of committees at certain interval. In 
Britain, the maximum time set for the government to respond to the recommendations of 
oversight committees is two months. The House of Representatives in Australia also obliges 
the concerned minister to give a statement on the steps taken by the government within three 
months of the committee placing its report on the floor of the House. However, as observed 
earlier, members of oversight committees have a tendency to focus more on policy than on 
expenditure. They do not find the examination of estimates as interesting and attractive. 
Notwithstanding the provision for sending estimates to committees, serious deficiencies in 
parliament's financial control still remains. Referring to Canada, one critic has argued that the 
procedure of the House for approving expenditure and taxation play virtually no substantive 
part in the decision-making process. Yet, a lack of control by committees or sporadic interest 
of members to check expenditure issues may not cause a chaotic situation in financial 
management. The treasury, which is charged with exercising the main control over 
expenditure in Britain and Australia, has always been considered as very effective. In Britain 
the government also makes public its expenditure plans at different times of the year, thereby 
providing opportunities to have an 'informed' public debate over them.  
 
77. In Bangladesh, not only can one notice serious deficiencies in the system of financial control; 
more importantly, those reponsible for financial mis-match even remain defiant, refusing to 
reform themselves voluntarily and/or to accept the recommendaitons of differenct watchdog 
agencies such as parliamentary commiittees. Parliamentary committees in Bangladesh are, in 
one sense, not good 'watchdogs', nor, however, can they be considered to be 'poddles'. What 
is, however, clearly evident is that there is a lack of convergence between the willingness and 
the ability of the members to do what is expected of them. Why do they behave the way they 
do has yet been explored properly. Several factors- structural, procedural, and political-may 
be identified.  
 
78. One of the structural drawbacks is the presence of the Minister as a member of the oversight 
committee. In fact, as long as ministers sit on committees as members and do not appear 
before them as witnesses, they will have a natural advantage over the backbench members. 
This will enable them to influence the setting of the agenda and manipulate the working of 
committees.ii As senior party leaders, ministers have the ability to help many government 
backbenchers achieve their career aspirations. Alternatively, they can block them. This may 
be seen as a deterrent against backbenchers taking a critical view of the working of a 
particular ministry, especially when the Minister remains present in committee meetings.  
 
79. An important structural drawback to making the committee system effective is the (negative) 
attitude of the bureaucracy. Although the bureaucracy does not always openly defy the 
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authority of committees, neither can it be seen as much hospitable to their suggestions or 
demands for more transparency and accountability. One of the important reasons is the 
overdependence of the successive ruling parties over the bureaucracy mainly for regime 
maintenance. Comparative experience shows that committees fare better in those systems 
where the bureaucracy is under some kind of pressure on a continual basis to adapt to 
changing political demands and priorities. In Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
substantive administrative reforms have preceded/followed reform of the parliamentary 
committee system. These have, to a large extent, reduced the capacity of the bureaucracy to 
short-circuit the implementation of decisions taken by committees; the activity of the 
bureaucracy is continually being monitored by committees and other agencies. In most of 
these democracies, top mandarins have even lost the previous guarantee of ‘job for life’. The 
general consensus in established democracies that the bureaucracy be kept under check or 
constant surveillance is an important factor, discouraging any serious resistance to 
suggestions made by committees. In Bangladesh, on the other hand, the main parties do not 
apparently have any plan for administrative reform; whatever attempts have been made over 
the last twenty five years have turned out to be abortive. The bureaucracy has traditionally 
resisted any plan for its reform. Notwithstanding the restoration of the parliamentary system 
of government in the 1990s, the relations between the political leadership and the 
bureaucracy still remain seriously imbalanced, with the latter exercising much more policy 
influence than the former. This may be seen as a serious constraint to the evolution of a 
strong committee system. 
 
80. One of the most important political factors is the role of the party. Parliamentary government 
is party government. Party is ubiquitous in a democratic system. In fact, one of the most 
important arguments in favour of strengthening committees is to lessening the influence of 
parties. Comparative experience shows that committees fare better in those countries where 
the party system is decentralised and party members have more freedom of action. Where 
parties exert limited or no control over committees, the latter are free to develop a life of their 
own and a strong contribution to the outputs of the legislature.iii In many parliamentary 
democracies, especially Britain where the party system is strongly entrenched, measures have 
been taken to reduce the scope for party influence in the nomination of members to 
committees and the way they behave. The influence of constituency parties, which play an 
important role in nominating parliamentary candidates, is also an important factor, limiting 
strong party control over the behaviour of MPs/committee members. In Bangladesh, on the 
other hand, parties not only play an extremely important role in assigning members to 
different committees, but also seek to regulate their behaviour in many ways. In particular, 
party heads exercise widespread discretionary powers including the authority to nominate 
candidates to parliamentary seats. Most of the members have to toe the party line; to attempt 
to play an independent role vis-à-vis the party is to risk disciplinary actions including refusal 
of party nomination in the next election. The ubiquity of the party is thus an important factor, 
limiting the effectiveness of committees.  
 
Proposals for Reform 
 
81. That the parliament in Bangladesh remains deficient in exercising oversight over government 
in general, and expenditure in particular, has long been recognised. This study has further 
confirmed this general conclusion. Some of the reasons that account for the 'limited' role of 
the parliament have also been identified. There is, however, no 'one best way' of overcoming 
the deficiency and to strengthen the parliament to enable it to exercise oversight more 
effectively. It is, however, often argued that procedural reforms may partially compensate the 
'deficit' in parliamentary influence in the scrutiny process. One British parliamentarian has 
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explained the need for and the rationale of procedural reforms in the following way: 
"Parliament dies if it does not update its procedures. Procedures are the muscle and sinew of 
parliament. If we do not exercise this muscle and keep it in good trim for contemporary 
challenge, then we shall have no real job to do". Another parliamentarian, however, has 
cautioned that there are limits to the speed with which modification of procedures can be 
done. He has observed: "There is a limit to parliament's power of assimilation. These powers 
depend greatly upon experience in working a machine, watching it work from year to year, 
trimming it here and there as necessary. There is a danger in the House (of Commons) 
innovating faster than the influence of experience can be brought to bear on its innovations". 
 
82. In Bangladesh parliamentary reforms have proceeded at a much faster rate than changes in 
other sectors, especially the bureaucracy, the party and the electoral system. Within a span of 
less than a decade, the parliament has introduced many noteworthy reforms, the two most 
important of which them are the restoration of the parliamentary system in 1991 and the 
establishment of an independent Parliament Secretariat in 1994. Among the procedural 
reforms, the democratisation of the committee system in 1997, the introduction of the Prime 
Minister's Question Time (PMQT) in 1997 and the so-called 'zero hour' in 1998 (which was 
terminated later) and the expansion of the power of the financial and oversight committees in 
1992 deserve special mention. But the bureaucracy and the party system, have not undergone 
any change for a long period of time; both provide serious constraints to the efficient working 
of parliament, in particular, committees. Thus whatever further measures are taken to reform 
the parliamentary procedures are likely to have limited impact unless measures are taken to 
reform especially the bureaucracy and the party system.  
 
83. This, however, is not to argue that parliamentary reforms be suspended until progress can be 
made in reforming the other 'political' sectors. Many of the parliamentary reforms undertaken 
so far are intended to increase the general oversight capacity of the parliament; only a few are 
specifically intended to strengthen its control over public finance. There is thus a clear case 
for reforming both financial procedures as well as strengthening the (financial) committees. 
One leading authority on the British government has remarked that in order to work 
effectively, committees must be wisely led and wisely fed. While there is a clear evidence 
that most of the chairmen are willing to spend more time than their predecessors in 
committee-related activity, their ability to work is largely constrained because the committees 
are 'unwisely' fed, to be appropriate, not fed at all. As observed in an earlier section, 
committees in Bangladesh are less-resourced and less-informed than their counterparts even 
in neighbouring countries. Without some kind of permanent, professional and expert 
assistance, it will be difficult for committees to do what is expected of them. It is not argued 
that the more the staff, the better will always be the performance of committees; to the 
contrary, committees may play a ceremonial role even when they have access to large staff 
and other resources. As an example, reference can be made to the well-resourced and well-
staffed Japanese committees, which rank second only to the U.S committees in this respect. 
Yet they still remain mostly ineffective. Their authority, as one of the leading scholars on the 
Japanese Parliament observes, "is a chimera and their accomplishments are largely 
meaningless".  
 
84. What is, however, argued is that the nature of staff and other support at present available to 
committees in Bangladesh is so insignificant that it may not encourage the chairmen and 
members to play any major pro-active role. But all committees do not need exactly the same 
level of support. While the provision for secretarial support is an absolute necessity for all 
committees, some others (committees), for example, the PAC and the PEC, may need 
substantial research support than others if they are to properly undertake the functions 
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assigned to them. Among the financial committees, the PEC may need more support than the 
PAC as the latter has an important source of expert advice and support- the CAG and his 
office. The PAC examines particular items of expenditure and the procedures associated 
therewith, taking as its starting point facts, which are already before it and beyond dispute. 
This means that the task of the PAC tends to be both exact in content and narrow in scope. In 
contrast, the inquiries of the PEC normally range more widely, have a more exploratory style 
and less exact in conclusion. It has thus to define for itself the issues which are important and 
has of necessity had to take a broad view of the kind of questions that it seeks to address. The 
need for staff and facilities is thus likely to vary. 
 
85. It is thus recommended that the Parliament/Institute of Parliamentary Studies immediately 
undertake a (staff) need assessment study, identifying the nature of staff and other support 
including research that different categories of committees need, and specifying the ways these 
can be provided to them. Meanwhile, urgent measures be taken to ensure that each committee 
receive at least a minimum level of facilities such as computer and photocopiers so that the 
output of whatever minimum staff support is now available can be maximised. 
 
86. The parliament, at present, is not much aware of the activities of committees. In the absence 
of any provision (mandatory or otherwise) for regular reporting to parliament, much of what 
the committees do remain unnoticed. Whatever contacts take place between the committees 
and the government departments remain outside the public purview. There is not much scope 
for ‘informed’ public scrutiny or debate on the activities of committees. Nor do the 
parliamentarians/people have any idea about the way(s) different ministries/departments 
respond to what the committees suggest. There is a need for making both the activities of 
committees and the relations between committees and the government more transparent.  
 
87. This can be done in different ways: firstly, by making the meetings of committees open; 
secondly, by making their findings/decisions public; and thirdly by a combination of both. To 
make the committee meetings open is, however, to risk discouraging critical scrutiny of 
issues that come up for discussion in committee meetings. More importantly, it may increase 
partisanship and discourage inter-party compromise. On the other hand, a change in the 
existing Rules requiring committees to report on a regular basis can help make both the 
committee activity transparent and also may encourage the bureaucracy anticipate possible 
reaction to the policies they pursue and the actions they take. Opportunities for debates on the 
reports will further strengthen the cycle of accountability. The House should also pay some 
attention to the reports of its committees for several reasons. Firstly, it produces public 
discussion of significant problems arising out of the activities of government. Secondly, 
attention in the House, especially through debate does strengthen the authority of these 
committees. Thirdly, it is some discipline for the departments to know that a critical report 
may not vanish immediately without trace but may be pushed up and put before the Minister 
in debate. 
 
88. It is recommended that the Rules be amended requiring financial and oversight committees to 
report to the House at least once in a year on their activities, and/or findings of inquiries into 
the lapses of the ministries. The government should be required to respond to the 
recommendations of committees within four months of the submission of the report. Five 
sitting days be reserved, preferably during the autumn session and the spring session, which 
are summoned mostly to satisfy the constitutional requirement than to undertake any serious 
parliamentary business, for debating committee reports. A part of the private members’ time 
may be allocated for the purpose. The existing Rule requiring committees to meet in private 
may be retained but they be allowed to hold public sessions, seek public submissions and 
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invite the ‘informed’ public to give evidence as and when they deem fit, especially when 
conducting inquiries.   
 
89. As observed earlier, there is relatively little scope for the parliament to exercise control over 
the planning of public expenditure; the only committee that can have some impact, the PEC, 
remains disadvantaged for a number of reasons. What is needed most is to devise 
mechanisms to ensure that the time allocated for deliberating over financial issues is spent in 
a productive and meaningful manner. This will call for a more rational allocation of time 
between different stages of the budget process, in particular, the general discussion and the 
discussion and vote on the demand for grants. Both stages are now characterised by intense 
partisan conflict; there is relatively little or no scope for partisan mutual adjustment in the 
whole process. One important way to compensate the deficiency is to carve out a certain 
portion of the time (allotted for budget discussion) for the committee-stage scrutiny of the 
budget, and the bills that are needed to give effect to government’s financial proposals. There 
is also the need to allocate more time for scrutinising the budget. The tendency of the 
government to pass bills including the budget in an unnecessary haste has to change. Two 
options can be identified: first, the budget session can commence earlier, preferably in May, 
and continue up to the end of June, thereby giving more time for deliberation. Alternatively, 
the parliament may grant supply for two months in advance immediately after the budget is 
(to be) presented in late June and refer it as a whole to a committee to be called budget and 
finance committee, and the separate demands for grants of different ministries to oversight 
committees. The amount of money granted in advance is to be intended to defray expenses in 
the early months of the new financial year when the committees will be required to scrutinise 
the budget proposals. The Constitution of Bangladesh, as observed in section two, allows 
such withdrawal in advance on the condition that it is embodied in the appropriation bill 
subsequently passed by parliament. The finance bill, introduced on the same day as the 
national budget is presented to the parliament, can also be referred to the proposed budget 
and finance committee. Rules should be made to define in clear terms the roles of committees 
in the scrutiny of financial proposals.  
 
90. In order to make the process effective and useful, committees may be given the power to call 
ministers and secretaries to defend their proposals before the committees. The time allocated 
for discussion of the budget and finance bill both in the House and in committees be 
distributed equally between the government and opposition benches. The House will, 
however, have comparatively less time to debate the budget if these proposals are 
implemented. But the now defunct ‘zero hour’, which allowed the members to have 
unscheduled debates on any topic of their own choice for half an hour every sitting day, can 
be reintroduced to compensate the loss. As the government has a majority in each committee, 
it does not have to be alarmed because of the proposal for referring the budget and the finance 
bill to committees. Committee scrutiny can certainly help improve, if not perfect, the 
proposals. If the government is not hospitable to any proposal made by committees, it can use 
its majority to defeat them in the House. But the gain that may accrue from the scrutiny of 
financial proposals in committees will certainly outweigh the cost.    
 
91. It is thus recommended that Rules be amended, requiring the referral of the budget and the 
finance bill to a new budget and finance committee, and the demands for grants of ministries 
to different oversight committees. These committees should be required to submit reports to 
the House within four weeks of referral, recommending amendments needed and specifying 
the logic underlying them. The House should be adjourned for a four-week period after the 
budget is presented to the House. The oversight committees should be allowed to suggest 
modification in the estimates of expenditure as embodied in the demands for grants; the 
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variation in the reduction of expenditure, however, should not exceed more than five per cent 
of the total estimate. The existing practice of moving cut motions in the House be 
discontinued. The Rules be amended requiring the House to give due consideration to the 
reports while discussing the budget and the demands for grants of different ministries. 
 
92. However, if there are alternative ways of strengthening the control of the parliament over the 
estimates of expenditure (and income) before they are being voted in the House, there is also 
a major need for improving the post-expenditure review undertaken by the CAG and the 
PAC. At present, the authority of the CAG is largely circumscribed. For all practical purposes 
including the approval of the budget, he is dependent on the Ministry of Finance. He lacks the 
power to hire the qualified and professional auditors, nor can he restructure the office, 
promote or reprimand staff or purchase equipment without the approval of the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Establishment. The proposal to strengthen the office of the CAG 
did not receive any favourable attention from the government in the past; the bureaucracy 
resisted the proposal for increase in staff and logistics.  
 
93. The Rules of Business, revised after the AL assumed state power in 1996, now require that 
the annual reports of the CAG be routed to the President through the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO). This is likely to have some negative consequences; in particular, this risks making 
the CAG vulnerable to the pressure and influence of the executive. Previously, the CAG 
submitted his reports directly to the President who, in turn, used to send them to the 
parliament. Until the middle of the 1990s, reports made by the CAG were usually a few years 
old, but some improvements took place during the tenure of the former CAG Hafizuddin 
Khan who somehow succeeded in clearing the backlog, to a considerable extent. 
Opportunities now exist for the CAG to report on the use of appropriations by the 
government in power. These may, however, cause some concern within the government and 
even make it sensitive to criticisms made in audit reports.  
 
94. But the problem cannot be solved only by making the CAG an officer of the parliament or by 
appointing an opposition MP as chairman of the PAC- proposals that have been widely 
canvassed in recent years by donors and other stakeholders. Both proposals are attractive, yet 
they are nor sufficient by themselves to ensure responsible government behaviour in financial 
management. There is an urgent need for separating audit from accounts, both functions now 
being performed by the CAG. As the same group of people performs the two functions of 
auditing and accounting, there remains a clear possibility of conflict of ethic. Lack of 
professionalism among auditors can also be seen as a handicap. As there is a risk that the 
quality of auditing may remain far from satisfactory, the effectiveness of the PAC is also 
likely suffer. The quality of the scrutiny of expenditure by the PAC is largely 
facilitated/constrained by the nature of reports produced by the CAG. As observed before, the 
PAC bases its work on the report of the CAG. What is needed most is to strengthen the office 
of the CAG and to promote more direct relationship between the PAC and the CAG. 
 
95. It is recommended that an independent audit department on the model of the British National 
Audit Office (NAO) be set up with the CAG as its head. The CAG be made an officer of the 
parliament and appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and chairman of the 
PAC. He should be given full control over personnel and finance of the proposed audit 
department and be made accountable to the PAC. The budget of the new department should 
be voted separately on the advice of the PAC to be headed by senior opposition MP. It is 
further recommended that the Rules be amended requiring the CAG to audit the accounts of 
the government in power on a priority basis and the PAC to scrutinise the current audit 
reports.  
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96. The PUC has not outlived its importance; in fact, as observed earlier, it has devised a new 
way of making its presence felt, and influencing a recalcitrant bureaucracy to respond to its 
suggestions. However, the scope of operation of the committee is comparatively wider than 
most other committees. In particular, it has to oversee the activities of a huge number of 
organizations, a function that it finds almost impossible to perform. There is thus a case for 
transferring the responsibility of the PUC to oversight committees and the PAC. This will 
also call for a redefinition of the role of these committees.  
 
97. It is recommended that the tasks now assigned to the PUC be distributed between the 
oversight committees and the PAC, with the latter absorbing the function of examining the 
reports and accounts of public undertakings, while the oversight committees be allowed to 
undertake other functions. The functions of the oversight committee be redefined 
as……oversee the expenditure, administration and policy of the ministries and the associated 
bodies under them. 
 
98. The above recommendations, if implemented, not only are likely to lead to an increase in the 
workload of financial and oversight committees; the members will probably be required to 
invest more time and energy in parliament/committee-related business. As observed in an 
earlier section, the majority of members are part-timers; they have other occupations to 
pursue. The demand on their time from their professions/vocations and the constituents has 
already resulted in poor attendance both in the sittings of the parliament and the committee. 
Thus the extent to which they will be willing to make 'more' use of their (new) permissive 
powers is difficult to ascertain. What is, however, clear is that the chairmen will especially be 
required to bear an 'unequal' burden; many of them may not be willing to do the extra-work 
unless some changes in the structure of incentives are made. The way these can be done be 
decided in consultation with the chairmen of committees. 
 
99. It is recommended that that the remit of  (proposed) need assessment study be broadened, 
allowing it to seek the opinion of the chairmen of committees on the type(s) of measures 
needed to induce them to assume the responsibility for further work.   
 
100. The parliament in Bangladesh has more committees than many other similar legislatures; 
there are, in fact, more committees than necessary. There is thus a major need for the 
rationalisation of the committee structure, preferably by grouping committees undertaking 
similar types of functions into a single category. More important than this is the need for 
coordinating the work of different committees through an institutional device so that 
duplication and overlapping can be minimised as far as possible, if not eliminated. In 
particular, there is an important need for regular contact/cooperation between the financial 
committees and the oversight committees in view of the changes proposed in their functions.  
 
101. It is recommended that a committee of committees, to be called Liaison Committee, be set 
up with the Speaker as the Chairman, and the chairmen of all committees as members, to 
coordinate the activities of different committees. The functions of the committee inter alia will 
be to consider general matters relating to the work of committees, to arbitrate conflicts (of 
jurisdiction) between them and to arrange the order in which the reports of committees are to 
be debated in the House. The committee be required to meet at regular intervals, preferably 
once in three months.       
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